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iABSTRACT
Regulator independence has been widely acknowledged by a large
segment of experts as significant for the growth and development of
the telecoms industry. However, the impact of regulatory
independence on industry growth has not been prominently analysed
from the perspective of developing countries.  This study was therefore
conceived and designed to determine whether the degree of
independence of the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) has
had any effect on the growth and development of the telecoms
industry in Nigeria. The parameters for regulator independence
examined include; stability of tenure, relationship between the
regulator and the various arms of government, fiscal and
organisational autonomy, regulator legitimacy as well as the regulator
authority to regulate. While the parameters for growth examined
include: access to service, usage of service, geographical spread, and
quality of service, competition and pricing. A connection between the
degree of regulator independence and industry growth and
development was subsequently established.
A descriptive method of analysis was adopted using the TRE technique
of assessment and the study confirmed that the NCC is
fairly/reasonably independent. Furthermore, evidence from both
primary and secondary sources indicated a remarkable but modest
growth and development in the Nigeria telecoms industry from 2001 to
2010.  The study found that Nigeria’s communication sector
development was positively affected by the degree of independence of
the regulator and government policy choices in the 1990s.
The result of this study may be an indicator of the success of the
telecoms market liberalisation programme embarked upon by the
Nigerian government.
ii
The telecoms market liberalisation facilitated the entry of many
telecoms companies providing various services as a result of which
Nigeria attracted considerable foreign investments making the country
one of the fastest growing and biggest telecoms market in Africa.
As a consequence of this development, the mobile sector of the
telecoms industry has seen triple digit growth rates for five years in a
row since competition was introduced. A number of additional players
have also entered the market under a new unified licensing regime
which is expected to boost the country’s underdeveloped Internet and
broadband sector. Third generation mobile and wireless broadband
services are being rolled out at a rapid pace. All this development is
supposedly as a result of the creation of an independent regulator, the
Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC).
On the other hand, this study shows that regulatory independence by
itself is not a sufficient condition to promote sector growth. This is
because, despite the fact that the study found the regulator (NCC) to
be fairly and reasonably independent, Nigeria remains at relatively
moderate levels of market penetration ― around 50% ― as reported
by Baez and Kechiche (2010, p.5).
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Descriptive Indicators
These are indicators that provide a narrative explanation of a situation
without recourse to mathematical formulation and modelling
Primary Data
This refers to data sourced directly from the field through primary
sources like interviews and questionnaire.
Regulation
An official rule, law or order clearly indicating how things are to be
done
Regulator
A person or an organisation charged with the responsibility of ensuring
compliance with regulations
Regulatory Environment
This is the environment where activities requiring regulation takes
place. This includes all stakeholders and their activities which are
connected to regulations
Regulatory Independence
This refers to a situation where a country has a separate agency
responsible for regulating an industry without being under the control
of a Ministry.
Regulator Independence
This concerns the degree to which a regulatory agency is free from
government interference in the conduct of its activities. The agency
would be financially autonomous and has adequate power and
authority to regulate industry activities
Research Population
This includes all elements of a group that constitute a whole which a
researcher intends to study
Secondary Data
This refers to all data obtained from reviewing academic work, books,
journals, newspapers, company reports, research reports, publications,
annual financial reports, international organisations reports,
government reports and reports from other reliable and accepted
sources.
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1CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND ON TELECOM REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE AND INDUSTRY GROWTH IN
NIGERIA
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The significance of a communication sector regulator and its
independence in the development of the telecommunications industry
is generally regarded as indisputable according to Thakur, Best & Jones
(2006). This, the authors argue, is because telecommunications is an
essential infrastructure of the modern information economy and its
expansion through private participation requires regulatory arbitration.
Furthermore, Wallsten (2001) submits that countries whose citizens
lack sufficient access to modern telecommunications networks, find it
difficult to be effectively integrated into the global economy. However,
to create the necessary environment required for a modern
telecommunications industry to thrive the independence of a regulator
must be guaranteed. According to the author, this will free regulators
from undue influence and interference from government policy-makers
in the course of carrying out their essential duty of ensuring fairness,
growth and development of the telecoms industry.
In recent years, major advances in Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) which resulted in rapid growth of global digital
telephony networks; the internet and broadband services have
transformed businesses and markets and generated significant wealth
and economic growth in many countries. They have also empowered
individuals and communities with new ways of doing things, as well as
transformed our ways of learning and sharing knowledge according to
FCC (1999).
2Meanwhile, the ability to harness the benefits of a developed
telecommunications sector is considered dependent on the
establishment of proper regulation in order to maintain standards and
provide guidance to operators and service standards to consumers as
well as the entire telecoms market. Proper industry regulation entails
the regulator having some measure of independence that will facilitate
the conduct of its responsibilities (FCC, 1999; Gutierrez & Berg, 2000;
OECD, 2004).
The literature has focused extensively on the justification for the
creation of regulator independence as one of the necessary conditions
for the successful liberalisation and subsequent development of the
telecommunication sector. It is widely and strongly argued that
regulator independence creates the enabling environment for the
development of the telecommunications sector through reducing
investment risks, thereby attracting direct foreign investment in the
sector (FCC, 1999; Gutierrez & Berg, 2000; ITU, 2002b).
Moreover, independent regulators are expected to play referee roles
while overseeing the transition from monopoly to competition, the
transfer of communication from public to private hands and improved
investments that eventually increase service access to the general
public and which in turn facilitates the development of a nation’s
economy. In the same vein, it is also accepted that the separation of
the regulated from the regulator is significant because it has the
benefit of creating a level playing field for competition to thrive thus
facilitating greater investment in the industry as a result of the
perception of fairness (FCC, 1999; Gutierrez & Berg, 2000; ITU,
2002b).
Studies conducted on the effect of independent regulators on industry
development indicate that the establishment of independent regulators
positively impacts on industry development in some countries.
3These studies show that while some countries have seen significant
improvement and expansion of telecoms services, in others the
situation is different (FCC, 1999; Gutierrez & Berg, 2000; Wallsten,
2001; ITU, 2002b; OECD, 2004; Thakur, Best & Jones, 2006).
Most previous studies on the significance of telecoms industry
regulator independence on industry growth generally focused on the
situation in developed countries and investigation into the implication
of regulator instruments to industry growth in Africa have been very
limited (Thakur, Best & Jones, 2006). This study aims to expand the
understanding of the significance of regulator independence on
industry growth in developing countries by closely examining the
situation in Nigeria.
1.2 REGULATOR INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA’S
TELECOMS INDUSTRY
Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa, with 154 million people
as at December 2009 as reported in the Africa Statistical Year Book
(AfDB 2010, p.6).  The mainstay of the economy is agriculture and oil;
which has an estimated GDP (current) of US$207.1bn, GDP per capita
income of US$1,370 and an annual GDP growth rate of 6.0% as at
2009 (AfDB 2010, p.6; World Bank 2010, p.4).
Reforms in the telecoms sector in Nigeria have seen a rise in telecoms
contribution to GDP up to 3% and an industry growth rate of 20.9%,
(NCC 2009, p.3; AfDB 2010, p. 6).
The contribution of the telecoms sector to GDP in Nigeria comes from
local inflows of capital, foreign investments, employment generation
and infrastructure development. Figure 1 below provides a graphical
representation of the percentage of telecommunications industry
contribution to GDP from 2001 to 2009 in Nigeria.
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Figure 1: GDP contributions from telecoms in Nigeria (2001 - 2009)
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Source: NCC (2010a)
As shown in figure 1, the contribution of the Nigeria
telecommunications industry to GDP rose steadily from 0.62% in 2001
to 3% in 2009. This growth could be described as fairly modest yet
significant. This increasing growth in industry contribution to GDP is
often attributed to the reforms that took place in the industry which
created the enabling environment for investment and sector growth.
The telecoms industry in Nigeria commenced its reforms in the 1990s.
The reforms were driven by a successful liberalisation program and the
realisation of the overall potential of the Nigerian telecom market to
grow given the large population of the country. The liberalisation of the
telecoms sector was achieved through various steps which were
designed to generate the needed investment that would ultimately
translate into growth in the sector and create spill-over growth in the
country’s economy as a whole.
5The Nigeria telecoms industry reform can be generally grouped into
two phases. The first phase was undertaken between 1992 and 2000
while the second phase took place from 2000 to 2008. The first phase
of the reform commenced with the enactment of the Nigerian
Communication Commission (NCC) Act of 1992. The Act established an
independent regulator and allowed the entrance of new operators in
the sector such as Starcomms Limited, Intercellular Nigeria Limited
and Multilinks - Telkom. These new entrants were given licences to
operate in specific regions of the country and to provide only fixed
wireless services, using the CDMA technology.  Other operators like
MTN Nigeria Communications, Mtel Nigeria Limited, Econet Nigeria
Limited and Globacom Limited were subsequently licensed to provide
mobile telephonic services. However, Nigeria Telecommunications
Limited (NITEL) a government-funded monopoly remained the
dominant player in the industry during this stage of the reform,
particularly in the fixed line segment.
Notwithstanding the enactment of the NCC Act of 1992, both the newly
established regulator (NCC) and the incumbent government telecoms
monopoly, (NITEL) remained under the supervision of the then Federal
Ministry of Communication.  This meant that every aspect of the
regulatory function in the telecoms industry had to be approved by the
Minister of Communications, thus making the Ministry play the role of
the regulator as well as the owner of NITEL. This structure remained in
place until 2000 when the NCC Act was first amended. This second
amendment to the Nigerian 1992 NCC Act in 2000 (which lead to the
significant empowering of the regulator) and the approval and
publishing of the National Telecommunication Policy (NTP - 2000),
earmarked the beginning of the second phase of the Nigeria
telecommunications industry reform. This generated the needed
momentum for the growth and development of the telecoms industry
in Nigeria.
6A further amendment was made to the Act in 2003 giving the regulator
(NCC) renewed independence.  Accordingly, Chapter 1, section 1 of the
NCC Act 2003 stipulates that:
The primary object of this Act is to create and provide a
regulatory framework for the Nigerian communication industry
and all matters related thereto and for that purpose and without
detracting from the generality of the foregoing specifically to:
Establish a regulatory framework for the Nigerian
communication industry and to create an effective, impartial and
independent regulatory authority.
The 2003 amendment to the NCC Act gave the regulator a new vigour
and impetus to regulate the industry towards the achievement of the
objectives of the enabling Act.  The main objectives of establishing an
independent regulator in the Nigeria telecoms industry include:
 Firstly, to ensure efficient provision of telecommunications
services. This objective was designed to drive the regulator
towards making certain that telecommunications services are
provided by operators to the public in an efficient manner devoid
of unnecessary delays or network problems.
 Secondly, the regulator is expected to ensure good quality of
service at reasonable prices. This is where affordability of
service provided by existing operators to the general population
and good service quality is an important regulatory requirement.
 Thirdly, the regulator is required to encourage the introduction
of new telecommunications services. These services are
expected to be consistent improvements of existing services and
infrastructure through innovation and creativity in line with
international standards.
 Fourthly, the regulator is expected to facilitate and promote
access to basic telecommunications services.
7 Finally, the regulator is required to guarantee the best use of
the country’s limited resources through cost-effectiveness and
continued creation of less costly ways of doing things.
On the basis of the above objectives, the regulator (NCC) took
significant steps to address the numerous issues affecting the growth
of the Nigeria telecommunications industry.  The result of this
culminated into the issuance of the first 3 GSM licences in 2001. MTN
Nigeria Communications Limited, MTS Communications and Econet
Nigeria Limited were the first operators to be issued with licences,
thereby opening up the industry to competition and efficiency
dividends.
Prior to 2001, teledensity in Nigeria for both fixed and wireless
telephony was less than 1%; the present teledensity has grown to a
remarkable 60.71% as at October 2010 (NCC 2010a, p.9).  However,
the data is more likely to reflect the number of SIM cards sold than the
actual penetration of mobile phones in Nigeria.
Although there is no apparent direct correlation between regulator
independence and the development of the telecommunications sector,
regulator risk remains one of the essential factors considered by
investors when making investment decisions in the
telecommunications industry in Nigeria. This presupposes that higher
volume of quality investment flow into the industry is connected with
investor perception of lower regulator risk and vice versa. It follows
that the volume of investment into the industry is one of the key
ingredients that determines the direction of industry growth and
development. One of the major concerns of this study among others is
to determine whether there is any direct interference by the Nigerian
government in the activities of the regulator (NCC) which might have
undermined its independence from inception and thus has affected its
capacity to provide excellent regulation in the industry.
8Whether by extension this might have affected the performance of
industry operators, flow of investment into the industry and the overall
development and growth of the industry in Nigeria.
The drive for improvement in the regulatory environment of the
Nigeria telecoms industry came about as a result of the need to
modernise the industry and the emergence of intense competition
among industry operators. Other reasons include the proliferation of
prepaid plans, low-budget handsets and the rapid expansion of mobile
networks to different parts of the country. Additionally, it is also
apparent from cursory observation of activities within the Nigerian
economy that the expansion of coverage to under-served areas by the
smaller CDMA operators may have generated increased competition.
This increased competition has helped in bringing down the overall
price of communication services, thereby making these services
accessible to a great percentage of the Nigerian population
Moreover, it is expected that due to intensity of this competition and
constant innovation from service providers, a great number of people
will see value in and be in a position to use telecoms services in
Nigeria. It could therefore be argued that this situation may have been
made possible as a result of the establishment of an independent
regulator in Nigeria, the Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC).
The determination of the extent of NCC’s independence and its effect
on the growth and development of the industry is one of the core
objectives of this study.
1.2.1 The policy and regulatory environment and structures of
the telecoms industry in Nigeria
The Nigerian telecommunication sector is presently guided by the
national ICT policy 2001 and the NCC Act 2003. The ICT policy (FGN,
2001) essentially formulated the e-strategies and governance model in
9use today in the country. The policy specified a vision of making
Nigeria an “IT-capable country in Africa and a key player in the
information society, using IT as the engine for sustainable
development and global competitiveness” (Mowete, 2007, p.65).
Furthermore, the NCC Act gave the Commission the responsibility of
supervising telecommunications services provision, establishing
technical standards, ensuring fair play and competitiveness, protecting
licencee’s and consumers alike, and generally ensuring the efficient
growth of telecommunications in the country. The Act further assigns
to the NCC, “the management and administration of frequency
spectrum for the communications sector”. It is also to assist the
frequency management council in developing a national frequency
plan”, among several other functions, including representing the
country at proceedings of international organisations and forums on
matters of interest to the regulation of communications and related
issues (FGN, 2003).
Additionally, there are other provisions of the Act, the most important
of which concerns regulator independence and universal
access/universal service. The Act specifies the development of a
regulatory regime, “which shall provide the widespread availability and
usage of network services and applications services throughout
Nigeria” particularly for under-served areas, or for un-served groups
within the community (Farroukh, 2006, p.21).
To strengthen the argument in favour of regulator independence in
developing the telecoms sector in Nigeria, specific provisions were
incorporated in the NCC Act. Chapter 1, section 1 of the NCC Act 2003,
specifies that the NCC shall
10
… promote the provision of modern, universal, efficient, reliable,
affordable and easily accessible communications services and
the widest range thereof throughout Nigeria; encourage local
and foreign investments in the Nigerian communications
industry and the introduction of innovative services and
practices in the industry in accordance with international best
practices and trends; protect the rights and interest of service
providers and consumers within Nigeria.
The governance of the Nigerian ICT industry shows that the regulator
is fairly independent, as it falls under the senate committee on ICT.
The Ministry of Information and Communications makes policy
recommendations to the President who has the final approval power on
policy issues while the national assembly approves all legislation
relating to the telecoms industry.
Figure 2 below depicts the policy and regulatory structure in the
Nigerian telecoms industry.
11
President
(Commander in Chief)
National Assembly
(Senate Committee on ICT)
NCC Governing BoardFederal Ministry of
Information &
Communications
Industry operators
MTN, ZAIN, Glo, Etisalat,
Starcomms, Visafone, Reltel,
Mtel & about 50 ISPs
Consumers
Figure 2: Policy and regulatory structure in Nigeria
Source: NCC (2010)
The regulator’s operations are guided by its governing board which has
nine commissioners appointed directly by the President. The
appointments are guided by sections 7 & 8 of the Act. However, the
Minister of Information and Communications has a supervisory
relationship with the Commission in the area of policy. Section 25 of
the NCC Act provides for the nature of such a relationship. The
Commission regulates all aspects of the operators’ business through
the issuance of licences, guidelines and regulations. It also has the
mandate to protect consumers and define standards for quality of
service under section 104 of the Act.
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It is evident from this Act that although the regulator is fairly
independent, there are areas where it seeks authorisation from the
Ministry of Information and Communications, particularly in the area of
spectrum management.
1.2.2 The Nigerian telecommunication/ICT market structure
Nigeria is now regarded as one of the fastest growing
telecommunications markets in the world. This informs the decisions of
major transnational telecoms operators (like MTN, Etisalat, Zain and
Globacom) to situate their largest African operations in Nigeria, which
has come to be regarded as one of their largest most profitable centres
in Africa. Presently the Nigeria telecommunications market is serviced
by the following GSM operators, CDMA mobile operators and
fixed/fixed wireless operators:
 Fixed/Fixed Wireless Operators
 NITEL
 Starcomms Limited
 Multilinks - Telkom
 Visafone Limited
 Reliance Telecoms – (RELTEL)
 Intercellular Nigeria Limited
 VGC/MTN
 MTS 1st Communications
 21st Century Technologies
 Disc Communications
 WiTel
 O’Net (Odua Telcom)
 Rainbownet Limited
 Monarch Communications
 XS Broadband
 Webcom
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The percentage of fixed/fixed wireless subscribers to the total
subscriber base as at October 2010 is 3% (NCC, 2010a)
 GSM Operators
 MTN Nigeria Communications
 Globacom Limited
 Etisalat International
 Zain Nigeria Limited
 M-Tel Limited
 EMTS Limited
The percentage of GSM subscribers to the total subscriber base as at
October 2010 is 85.6% (NCC, 2010a)
 CDMA Mobile Operators
 Multilinks-Telkom
 Starcomms Limited
 Visafone Limited
 Reliance Telecoms (RELTEL)
The percentage of CDMA Mobile subscribers to the total subscriber
base as at October 2010 is 11.4% (NCC, 2010a).
Generally, the industry has seen a substantial growth over the last
decade with a total subscriber base of active lines standing at 85
million generating a growth in teledensity of 60.71% by October 2010.
Prior to 2001, teledensity for both fixed and wireless was less than
1%. (NCC, 2010a). This performance indicates a slow and steady
progress towards total coverage. It must, however, be carefully noted
that the reported active lines of 85 million people did not reflect the
multiple SIM card ownership as well as fixed line ownership combined
with the SIM card situation prevalent in the country.
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This is because in Nigeria an average user of telephone services owns
at least two SIM cards operated by different service providers.
Additionally, all fixed line owners also hold various SIM cards. This
multiple SIM card/fixed ownership situation arose largely as a result of
the poor quality of service provision in the industry which forces people
to simultaneously use different service providers to avoid being
disappointed. Therefore the actual number of people connected to
telephone services is considerably lower than the recorded 85 million
reported by the NCC. However, this limitation notwithstanding, there
has been a remarkable increase in the number of people connected to
telephone services in Nigeria from 2001 to date.
Figure 3 below shows the growth of subscriber base from 2001 to
2008.
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Figure 3: Growth of Subscriber base in Nigeria (2001 – 2008)
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Source: ADB Year Book 2010
Figure 3 above clearly indicates the growth of subscriber base in
Nigeria as a result of the reforms that facilitated the emergence of
numerous service providers due to the breaking up of government
monopoly (NITEL) in the telecoms industry. It The growth in the use of
mobile telephone services has been exponential, reaching a peak of
417 lines per 1 000 of the population in 2008. The explosion of the
mobile industry in Nigeria has reportedly resulted in a series of positive
effects across the economy, ranging from investment in networks to
the creation of employment (NCC, 2010).
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According to Farroukh (2006) and Mowete (2007) the economic
benefits associated with the increase in mobile telephony services in
Nigeria extend beyond the investment that network operators allocate
to licence fees, taxes and network equipment and include the following
factors: firstly, end users spend money on mobile telecoms services
and devices which allows the industry to flourish particularly new
industries. Secondly, the telecoms operators’ spending on marketing,
distribution, maintenance, training, support and network
enhancements creates important benefits for all involved in the value
chain. Thirdly, mobile phone service operators as well as other
operators in the telecoms industry create employment, both direct and
indirect, and invest in the development of the labour force.
Finally, mobile phone services and other telecoms services within the
industry also enable end users to conduct their daily business in a
more effective manner, reduce the time and cost of transactions,
improve access to markets, commoditise information and generally
allow businesses to operate more efficiently.
One way the mobile telephone sector has facilitated the efficient
functioning of businesses is through the emergence of mobile banking
in Nigeria. Mobile banking has made it possible for banking clients to
access and use various banking products and services through the use
of their mobile phones without physically visiting a bank branch. As a
result, all the banks operating in Nigeria have introduced mobile
banking given the NCC (2010a) reported active GSM subscriber base of
77 million (active SIM card holders) which represents a massive 91.1
percent of industry market share. However there is still inadequate
infrastructure to cover the country and a huge gap in investments in
spite of high returns on investment witnessed in the industry over the
last ten 10 years. Consumer protection and quality of service is still a
major issue because termination of calls and disruption of services are
still prevalent in the system.
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1.2.3The Nigeria telecoms environment and the emerging
information society
As the global telecoms market continues to grow at rapid pace,
particularly in the area of mobile services with subscriptions surpassing
4.5bn in 2009, the Nigeria telecoms industry has also been witnessing
some measure of development. Presently, Nigeria has two national
carriers, four mobile telephony services providers, 22 fixed telephony
operators, 52 VSAT operators, as well as 36 registered Internet service
providers (Baez and Kechiche, 2010).
According to available records, the market leader in the provision of
telecommunications services is MTN, which has 41% of the market
share, followed by GLOBACOM, whose subscription base stands at
about 6.4 million, representing about 26% of the sector’s total
subscription. ZAIN, an earlier close rival of MTN, has 14% of the
market share, and ETISALAT has 10%, whilst the incumbent
(NITEL/TRANSCORP) has only 2% of the share; a figure that is
significantly less than the total of 5% shared among the Private
Telephone Operators (PTOs), who offer fixed wireless services, using
the TDMA standard. The finding revealed that private investment in the
telecommunications sector, which stood at US $50million in 1999 rose
to US $1 200 million in 2001 and was in excess of US $20 billion by
the end of 2009 (NCC, 2010a).
It is reasonable to assume that these developments occurred as a
result of the various reforms of the sector embarked upon in the
country. This assumption becomes more credible on the basis of with
the realisation that the first phase of the reform hinged on the fact that
Nigeria, being a member of the Commonwealth and a signatory to
most multilateral agreements and conventions on ICT, has an
obligation to comply with the terms of those agreements and
conventions either by adopting and implementing those protocols or by
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localising those terms through legislation. This obligation eventually
obliged the government to pass the Nigerian Communication
Commission Act 1992 which sets the tone for liberalising the sector
and provided the enabling environment for the licensing of new
players.
Moreover, that piece of legislation opened up the industry to private
players from both within the country and internationally. The
emergence of these new players introduced massive competition in the
industry among the new players and more especially with the
incumbent Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL). As observed
amply by Ndukwe (2005) the liberalisation of the telecoms industry in
Nigeria led to the entry of foreign firms as independent operators or as
joint venture partners with the government-owned monopoly.
In order to speed up the development of the sector, one of the major
provisions of the telecommunication industry reform in Nigeria was the
establishment of a regulatory agency to oversee the transition from
monopoly to competition. This was done through the creation of the
National Regulatory Agency (NRA) in 1993 which subsequently
transformed into the NCC. At the initial stages of implementation,
however, the impact of the reform and that of the regulator remained
limited. This is as a result of the dominant control the Ministry
exercised over the affairs of the NRA/NCC as well as the monopoly
power of NITEL being the incumbent government owned operator. This
situation led to a failure to attract much investment into the industry
as only small operators with little resources could be licensed during
this period. Other problems experienced by the regulator at that time
as reported by the NCC (2009) include political interference, structural
defects in terms of organisational flexibility and adaptability to the
dynamism of the industry, financial dependence on government
funding, capacity as well as technical issues.
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These are problems globally recognised by experts as a major
hindrance to the successful establishment and operation of an
independent regulator.
1.2.4 Overview of the importance of regulatory independence
in Nigeria
Several experts concur that the essential nature of the telecoms
industry necessitates the establishment of regulators to ensure that
standards are maintained in line with international service
expectations. This appears to be the situation in Nigeria, where the
Ministry of Communication and the incumbent (NITEL) increasingly
failed to meet the yearnings of the public in terms of access to
telephone services. This situation generally led to calls for the
establishment of an independent regulator in order to ensure proper
monitoring of the industry and to supervise its growth in Nigeria.
The independence of the regulator is seen as necessary for a
successful transformation of the telecommunication industry.
Therefore, in its bid to reap the expected benefits of having an
independent regulator the Nigerian government commenced a full
review of the telecommunications industry in 1997 and eventually
created and approved a new National Telecoms Policy (NTP) which
came into effect from year 2000 according to Ndukwe (2005). The
author described the NTP - 2000 as a policy that strengthened the
telecom sector liberalisation effort in the country. This is because the
policy placed emphasis on the establishment of a single independent
regulator thus creating the environment needed for competition to set
in and thrive in the industry.
Other motivations for the establishment of an independent regulator in
Nigeria include the need to expand the frontiers of service provision
and ensure efficient service delivery, as well as guarantee
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sustainability. These reasons encouraged the government to liberalise
the telecommunication industry further, thereby facilitating the flow of
private capital into the industry.
Other factors responsible for breaking up the government’s monopoly
in this industry could be attributed to the continuous subsidy to the
industry which had become unsustainable with other competing
demands on the government. There is also the issue of obsolesce and
the huge bad debt portfolio of the incumbent service provider (NITEL).
Arguments in favour of more reforms within the country and external
pressures spurred the government in Nigeria to initiate a full and more
holistic reform of the industry commencing in 1997. It also strongly
argued that the existence of a good telecommunications system in a
well-developed telecommunications industry facilitates employment
generation, and makes it easy to conduct business transactions, which
in turn expand the economy.
This position is amply supported by Kessides (2004, p.25) who posits
that “Widely available and affordable telecommunications and
transportation services can foster grassroots entrepreneurship and so
are critical to generating employment and advancing economic
development”. Baez and Kechiche (2010 p. 20) amplified this position
when they declared that “Socio-economic development and sustenance
of any modern nation is dependent on the adequacy of the nation’s
telecommunication and information technology infrastructure”
In Nigeria two major government agencies were given the
responsibility to facilitate the liberalisation of the telecom industry, the
agencies are; Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC) and the
Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE).
The milestone historical development of the telecommunications
environment in Nigeria is depicted in the table below.
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Table 1.2.4: Milestone Developments in the Nigeria Telecoms
Industry (1992 – 2009)
Year Events/Developments
1992 • Enactment of the Nigeria Communications Commission Act
establishing the Nigerian Communications Commission to regulate the
telecoms industry
• NITEL–state monopoly incumbent – 1 telephone to 440 people
1993 • NCC inaugurated -starts issuing licences for various services
including provision of payphone services, community telephone services
2000 • National Telecoms Policy –short & medium term objectives to
promote ICT
• Auctions for GSM licences
2001 • DML auction –licences granted at US$285 mill each to MTN and
Econet; M-Tel/NITEL’s licence reserved
• GSM services start in August 2001
2002 • Fourth GSM and Second National Carrier licence (SNO) – was
granted to Globacom Nigeria Limited at US$200 mill
• Long distance carrier licences –NEPSKOM & MTS 1stWireless
• Regional Fixed Wireless Access Licences auction –25 companies
awarded 50 licences
• NITEL’s national carrier and international gateway became operative
2003 • Privatisation process of NITEL commences -NITEL & M-Tel separation
• Telecommunications Act 2003 was enacted.
• NCC Act 1992 Amended
2004 • Three national long-distance operator licences became operative
• All operators introduced per-second billing
2005 • Two national long-distance operator licences became operative
2006 • End of DML ‘exclusivity’ period
• Introduction of Unified Licensing Regime, 13 companies were
granted licences
• 5% of NITEL & M-TEL sold to TRANSCORP
2007 • National carrier licence granted to Prest Cable & Satellite TV Systems
• NCC issued 3G UMTS licences to MTN, Zain, Globacom and  Alheri
Engineering
• NCC awarded fixed wireless licences
2008 • Gateway Telecoms Integrated Services national long-distance licence
becomes operative
• Etisalat launched services
2009 • NCC awarded licences in the 2.3GHz band to four operators
Source: NCC, (2010); Baez & Kechiche - Pyramid Research (2010); and
Farroukh - MTN Nigeria (2006)
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In concluding this section of the chapter, the degree of regulator
independence is determined by assessing the regulator’s performance,
funding structure, relationship with executive and legislature as well as
the appointment, tenure and termination of key management and
board members. The regulator needs to earn legitimacy through
communications, competence and transparency of decisions to be
considered reasonably independent from the government or industry
operators.
A careful analysis of the Nigerian situation may show that the degree
of independence of the regulator has been improving over the last few
years especially following the 2003 NCC Act. As a result any direct
interference from the parent ministry of the regulator in Nigeria is
perceived as very damaging to the independence of the regulator. This
is because intervention in the activities of the regulator by the ministry
is seen as more damaging to regulator independence than intervention
by the president of the country. Thus it can be concluded that it is very
important for the perceived independence to be maintained and not to
put the regulatory body under the ministry’s total control but to
distance it from the ministry as much as possible.
The factors surrounding appointment of key regulator personnel often
affect the public’s perception regarding the independence of the
regulator in Nigeria. It is essential that these appointments are
handled carefully without political considerations. It is especially
important that the head of the regulating body is appointed for a fixed
time period and that dismissal is a difficult thing. It is also necessary
for regulator independence that the regulatory body has substantial
authority and functional responsibilities in the industry. These include
spectrum allocation, granting licences and collecting industry data.
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It is important for the regulator to be self-sustaining, by earning its
own income through levies and licence fees, rather than depending on
funding by the government or donors which may be linked to
conditions that could affect its capacity to be a fair arbitrator/umpire in
the industry. Finally, any challenge to the regulatory decisions should
be through the legal path in a court of law rather than resorting to the
usual clannish, ethnic, religious and political loyalist approach to
resolving issues prevalent in Nigeria.
Conversely, the careful handling of all the issues surrounding regulator
independence is essential to facilitate the industry growth and
development in Nigeria.
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Nigeria joined the league of countries enjoying mobile
telecommunication services and having an independent telecom
regulator in 2001, as a result of the approval of the National Policy on
Telecommunication and the issuance of three (3) GSM licences. In the
decade since then, some progress has been recorded in terms of
increased teledensity and geographical coverage in infrastructure. In
spite of this progress however, the penetration rate is not sufficient as
over 69 million people remain without access to both fixed and mobile
telephone services in a country with a population of over 154 million
people (NCC 2010a, p.9; FGN 2010, p.3).
Moreover, the penetration of broadband technology and internet
services has been very slow and inadequate with services available
only at major urban centres. Access to these services is limited in the
rural areas with only a few people having any access to telephone and
internet services. Where services are available the quality is often very
poor.
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This is a major concern as it is related to the core regulatory objective
of geographical spread of infrastructure, and telecommunications
access and usage by the Nigerian citizenry. This concern among
others formed the basis for the telecoms industry reform in Nigeria in
the first instance. Another major concern is in the area of creating an
independent regulator for the telecoms industry in Nigeria. The
country’s effort in establishing an independent regulator in the
telecoms industry is in line with the stated aspirations of various
Nigerian governments to address this concern and galvanise growth in
the industry.
As identified by Thakur, Best and Jones (2007, p.26) “Most
governments interested in promoting a vibrant telecoms sector will
seek to build a strong and independent regulator to ensure that
national development goals are also met”. However, achieving the
independence of the regulator may be hampered by institutional and
political issues as the outcome of the study conducted by Thakur, et al
(2007, pp. 30-34) indicated.
The central question for this study therefore is to determine whether
the establishment of NCC in Nigeria has created the required
regulatory independence free from undue influences from government
and political interests and whether this independence has facilitated
the development of the sector. We also looked at other variables that
have impacted on telecommunications sector growth such as
technology, business models and government policy choices for
opening the sector.
1.4 PURPOSE STATEMENT
This study examines the significance of regulator independence on
growth in the telecommunications industry in Nigeria with specific
reference to:
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1. The form and character of regulatory independence
2. The implications of regulatory interventions on access and
geographical spread of telecommunication infrastructure in the
country
3. The extent to which the regulator was able to monitor the
activities of industry operators particularly in setting
interconnection prices, allocation of resources such as spectrum,
and monitoring the quality of service and consumer rights.
4. The role of the regulator in accelerating the access and
utilisation of the telecoms services in the country.
This study investigates the relationship between access/ usage and
independence of a regulator. The main dimensions of the regulatory
agenda studied include universal access, interconnection rates, access
to resources, competition and fair trading and quality of service. The
outcome of this study provides a deeper understanding of regulatory
institutions and how they interact with industry players as well as
other agents within the economy. It also provided useful insight into
the desirability of regulator independence in galvanising growth and
development in the Nigerian telecommunications industry.
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The general objective of this research is to define the characteristics of
the telecommunications market in Nigeria and assess the importance
of independence of the regulator in the growth of the industry. To
assess the linkage between regulatory independence and sector
performance, this study:
1. Analyses the governance framework in the
telecommunications industry in Nigeria and how this has
influenced sector performance.
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2. Assesses the effect of independence of the regulator in
Nigeria on the development of the telecoms market in
terms of geographical spread of infrastructure, universal
access, interconnection pricing, quality of service and fair
trading and competition.
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTION
The main research question
What is the extent of regulator independence in the Nigeria
telecoms industry and how has this affected the development
and performance of the industry?
Sub questions
1. How has regulator independence affected industry
performance with respect to access to telecoms services in
Nigeria?
2. What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to increased telecoms service
usage in Nigeria?
3. To what extent has regulator independence affected telecoms
industry performance with respect to pricing in Nigeria?
4. What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to competition in Nigeria?
5. In what ways has regulator independence affected industry
performance with respect to quality of service and customer
satisfaction in Nigeria?
1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study establishes the significance of the regulator independence
and its impact on the performance of the telecommunications industry
in Nigeria, specifically addressing issues relating to capital investment,
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infrastructure development, access and usage and consumer
protection and satisfaction.
In examining the degree of independence of the regulator attention
was given to the issue of separation between policy formulation and
implementation as well as separation between the regulator and the
industry being regulated. Analysis of regulatory independence was
drawn from an understanding of the governance framework of the
industry, in particular the interactions between various industry actors
and stakeholders.
This study further assesses among other things, the implication of the
governance framework and provisions of the NCC Act 2003 and other
instruments on the performance of the telecoms sector in Nigeria. The
study did not compare and contrast Nigeria with other countries. Nor
did it assess the performance of the telecommunications against other
sectors due to limitation of time, cost, and data availability.
1.8 CHAPTER SCHEME
This dissertation is structured to contain six chapters as follows:
Chapter One: Background on telecom regulator independence
and industry growth in Nigeria
This chapter consists of research introduction and background
regarding the significance of telecom industry regulator independence
in Nigeria, problem statement, purpose statement, research
objectives, research questions, scope and limitations of the study as
well as chapter scheme.
Chapter Two: Theoretical framework
This chapter surveys existing literature on the significance of regulator
independence in the telecommunications industry. The contributions
made by pundits and authors, gurus and practitioners in this realm
was reviewed and presented. The chapter explores the issues of
regulation, regulator independence, the structure and governance for
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regulator independence, measuring regulator independence,
independence and accountability of the regulator, sustaining
independence of the regulator, challenges of the lack of regulator
independence, constraints of achieving independence, regulatory
function and regulator independence, customer-driven regulation and
regulator independence and provided a conclusion.
Chapter Three: Research methodology, data generation and
evaluation approach
This chapter deals with the research methodology covering an
introduction, perspectives on measuring effectiveness of regulator
independence, as well as methods of gathering primary and secondary
data, including discussion of a qualitative analysis approach based on
the TRE survey technique and structured interviews. The chapter
further discussed a number of descriptive indicators for data gathering
and analysis, as well as the data analysis technique.
Chapter Four: Data on the degree of telecom regulator
independence and industry growth in Nigeria
This deals with the presentation of findings of the research. The result
and findings from the interviews conducted with respondents
representing the research population will be presented in this chapter.
The study population includes policy makers, senior staff of NCC and
Federal Ministry of Information and Communications, operators,
customers and experts in academia, media practitioners, civil society
and politicians.
Chapter Five: Analysis and interpretation of research findings
on telecom regulator independence in Nigeria
This chapter provides an analysis of the results/findings presented in
chapter four. The results/findings will be used to answer the research
questions put forward in chapter one and specifically achieving the
research objectives set for the study.
Chapter Six: Summary, conclusion and recommendations
This chapter provides a summary, conclusion and recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing recognition of the significance of regulator
independence in the telecoms industry originates from the
continuously expanding global applications of Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) which are transforming local,
national, regional and international telecommunications systems into
network economies and have since become the foundation for modern
information societies. These applications are being built upon
expanded and upgraded national telecoms networks, turning them into
new information infrastructures. The point of entry to participation in
these new economies and societies is through local communication
networks, which determine the access possibilities and boundaries of
opportunity for individuals, organisations and countries.
Moreover, the global telecoms reform process making waves around
the world is expectedly directed towards creating an environment that
will foster a massive expansion in the coverage and capabilities of
these information infrastructure networks. This is usually done with
national telecoms regulators as the key implementers of these policies
of reform. The various reforms introduce the concept and practice of
regulator independence as a veritable means of generating added
investment for expansion as well as industry growth and development
(Ndukwe, 2005; Mwenda, 2006; Eberhard, 2007; Baez and Kechiche
2010).
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This chapter explores the literature and presents informed arguments
on issues relating to the effectiveness associated with the
establishment of an independent regulator as a necessary ingredient of
telecoms industry growth and development.
The chapter examines the issues of regulation, regulator
independence, the structure and governance for regulator
independence, measuring regulator independence, independence and
accountability of the regulator, sustaining independence of the
regulator, challenges of the lack of regulator independence, constraints
of achieving independence, regulatory function and regulator
independence, customer-driven regulation and regulator independence
and provided a conclusion.
2.2 REGULATOR INDEPENDENCE
Most literature on regulation, regulator independence and the ICT
industry assumes regulator independence provides a good
environment that stimulates industry efficiency and enhanced private
enterprise. Additionally, it is widely held that the manner in which
political and social institutions of a country interact with the regulatory
process is generally expected to influence the economic conditions
necessary for industry growth and development and by extension
foster national growth and development (Melody, 1997; Gutierrez &
Berg, 2000; Wallsten, 2001; Baudrier, 2001; Gual, 2003; Gilardi,
2003; Bandaranayake, 2005; Ndukwe, 2005; Thakur, Best & Jones
2006l; Gual & Trillas, 2006; Eberhard, 2007; and Samarajiva, 2008).
Meanwhile, despite the frequent use of the term regulation by many
experts and practitioners, there is little scholarly or practice agreement
on its acceptable meaning. The International Compliance Association
(ICA) according to Mwenda (2006, p.6) defines regulation as “a set of
binding rules issued by a private or public body”.
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The author continues that “regulations are those rules that are applied
by all regulators in the fulfilment of their functions”. Baldwin et al.
(1998, pp.3–4) distinguish three main conceptions in the literature
regarding the concept and meaning of regulation.
The first conception sees regulation as the whole range of mechanisms
of social control, the second sees regulation as all efforts of state
intervention in the economy, and the third conception regards
regulation as the creation and application of targeted rules. The first
conception is the broadest one as it takes into account all mechanisms
of social control, including both intentional and unintentional
processes, and both state and non-state activities. In this situation all
mechanisms which have the capability to steer individual or collective
behaviour can be regarded as regulatory (Baldwin, Scott & Hood,
1998, p.4).
Accordingly Majone (1994, p.78), opined that it is this broad
conception of regulation, which includes the whole realm of legislation,
governance and social control that defines global literature on the
subject matter of regulation. However, the author emphasises that
such a broad use of the term is not very beneficial for the study of
regulation. “If it is true that reductionism is a necessary condition of
scientific progress, it is not surprising that the analysis of regulation as
a particular type of policy-making is still in its infancy”. The second
conception is considered less broad and focuses on the efforts of state
actors which are aimed at steering the economy. Although this
conception excludes unintentional processes and non-state activities, it
still incorporates the whole range of tools which state actors can use to
intervene in the economy, among which include rule-making and
application, taxation, subsidisation, out sourcing or contracting out,
and public ownership (Baldwin et al. 1998, p.3; and Noll 1980, pp.4–
14).
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Therefore regulation not only refers to rules with direct implications for
economic behaviour, but also to incentives which aim to influence this
behaviour indirectly. The third conception sees regulation as the
promulgation and enforcement of an authoritative set of rules and is
considered as the leanest conception among the various conceptions.
In this situation, regulation is not seen as an equivalent of state
intervention, but as one specific form of it. Particularly, it is regarded
as the main alternative to public ownership.
Additionally, Mitnick (1980, p.7), in his contributions for instance,
defines regulation as “the public administrative policing of a private
activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest”. On the
other hand Selznick (1985, p.363) defines regulator as a “sustained
and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that
are valued by a community.” This definition sees the term regulation
as excluding taxation, subsidisation and public ownership, but takes in
all activities related to the creation of rules, the evaluation and
scrutiny of economic behaviour, and the application of sanctions for
non-compliance with the rules.
Furthermore, in a number of instances the authority to design
regulations and the authority to implement regulations and hand out
sanctions for breach of regulations is vested in two or three different
bodies. But it is desirable for the sake of efficiency and effective
achievement of regulatory objectives to locate the design and
implementation and sanction for breach of regulations in a single
entity. This single entity must be vested with the necessary authority
to carry out its functions without undue political interference. This
freedom to operate without interference is referred to as regulator
independence and is essential to the regulator’s ability to perform its
responsibilities in its bid to achieve regulatory objectives (Mwenda,
2006; Eberhard, 2007; Baez and Kechiche 2010).
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Generally, the main objectives of regulation in the telecoms industry as
identified by Bandaranayake (2005, p.25) include: guaranteeing the
best use of the country’s limited resources, ensuring good quality of
service at reasonable prices, ensuring efficient provision of
telecommunications services, promoting universal access to basic
telecommunications services and encouraging the introduction of new
telecommunications services.
Additionally, Walker (2001, p.17) identified seven objectives/functions
of telecoms industry regulation as follows:
 Promotion of competition: This involves setting up guidelines
that will focus on removing barriers to entry into the telecoms
market, reducing cost of entry into the telecoms market,
removing barriers for customers to switch from one operator to
another, encouraging investment in infrastructure deployment,
transparency of customer information, enhanced quality of
service and general customer satisfaction.
 Achieving social objectives: This involves ensuring that everyone
gets access to telephone services, enhancement of access,
usage and geographical spread of telecoms service as well as
the existence of and general access to emergency numbers.
 Dealing with negative network externalities: This relates to
ensuring the elimination of radio interference and other
connectivity related problems.
 Consumer protection: Consumers expect quality service at
reasonable prices. The regulator is expected to ensure that
consumers are protected against operators who may want to
charge high tariffs for services without providing quality service
delivery. The regulator must also create a means by which
consumers can express their grievances with respect to poor
prices or quality of service.
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 Managing scarce or finite resources: This relates to using all
sources to generate funding and using such funds judiciously
and efficiently. This includes funds deployed towards radio
spectrum and numbering activities as well as all other regulatory
activities.
 Preventing anti-competitive behaviour: This involves stopping
the provision of services below cost and cross subsidisation
among operators in order to dominate or attract the largest
number of customers. Although, this may be good for
consumers it may be have an adverse effect on the business
environment.
 Protecting the operators from collapse and failure: This relates
to the affairs of the state in ensuring the continuity of operator
services and the integrity of their networks against both internal
failures and external threats, both natural and man-made.
However, for the regulator to be able to achieve these objectives and
have the capability of stimulating industry and national growth, some
degree of independence must be given to the regulator. This is
because the independence of the authorities responsible for regulation
is capable of creating a good environment for industry growth and
development as well as national growth and development.
Further to this, it must be clearly noted that the possibility of the
existence of an absolutely independent regulatory agency is neither
feasible nor required. An absolutely independent regulator may be
tempted to set and implement its own agenda without supervision,
thus opening the process to all manner of abuse. Independent
regulators are expected to be subject to government oversight and a
system of checks and balances.
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It is in support of the requirement for checks and balances that made
Smith (1997) insist on regulators being monitored to deter them from
inefficiency and corruption. According to the author checks and
balances makes the regulator remain focussed on fulfilling its mandate.
Furthermore, these checks and balances will enable the regulator to
achieve its objectives effectively and efficiently thereby facilitating
industry growth and development and by extension the growth and
development of the national economy.
However, regulator independence is very important in attracting
foreign investment into the telecom industry. This is because regulator
independence gives prospective operators the confidence to enter the
industry especially in emerging market economies. This position is
amply supported by many experts including Williams (1997), Levy and
Spiller (1994), and Galal and Bharat (1995) they all generally agree
that the entry of new players into the telecom industry is largely
dependent on the perception of impartiality in regulation occasioned by
the presence of a good and fairly independent regulatory agency. They
further accept that these new industry entrants bring about increased
competition with its attendant benefits of innovation, invention, new
products and services.
Resistance to regulator independence is gradually disappearing as
ministries and other government departments that were previously
adamant on retaining the power to regulate and control industry tariff
and other regulatory matters are now seeing the benefit of delegating
such powers to separate independent entities. These benefits as
argued by Smith (1997, p.4) include “improving offers from investors,
helping to sustain reforms, and shifting responsibility for unpopular
decisions to someone else”.
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It is evident from the foregoing discussions that regulator
independence is crucial to the growth and development of the telecoms
industry in particular and other essential sectors like the utility service
industries. The freedom of regulators from political interference while
performing their regulatory responsibilities enhances the quality of
their decisions. It gives the regulator the courage to take hard and
difficult decisions without leaning towards any political ideology.
However, the success of a regulator in conducting its affairs partly
depends on the structure and governance for regulatory independence
in any given country.
2.3 THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE FOR REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE
The structure of regulatory independence has become clearer and
more globally prominent over the years as a result of the entry of
many profit-driven players in the telecoms industry. This entry
necessitated the establishment of regulators to ensure that standards
are maintained and investments continue to flow into the industry
unabated.
Consequently, Shirley (2000), Noll (2000), Levy and Spiller (1996) all
believe that industry expansion and development partly depends on
the credibility and independence of the regulator. Conversely, as the
industry continues to grow and technology continues to advance,
government controlled regulations begin to suffer due to the increasing
complexity of monitoring the industry by government departments or
ministries. As observed by Melody (1997 p.34) “the failure of
regulation is linked to strong influence of government in the affairs of
the regulator”.
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This led to calls for the establishment of independent regulators in
order to ensure proper monitoring of the industry and to supervise its
growth. The independence of the regulator is seen as necessary for a
successful transformation of the telecommunication industry. As
Melody stressed further “... a high degree of independence is justified
by a comparable degree of accountability. Telecoms competition is still
limited to major industry players and being played primarily in the
arena of politics and bureaucracy. Only strong independent regulation
can move it into the market place where it can help achieve the goals
of telecoms reform”. The concept of independence was further
emphasised by Melody to the effect that “in principle, it is not different
from a delegation of specific responsibility, authority and accountability
for the performance of specific activities in organisations”.
Over the years, multilateral institutions and researchers alike have
argued that “one potential way to alleviate the time inconsistency
problem in infrastructure policy, which has been explored recently both
in developing and developed countries, is the establishment of an
independent regulator for the relevant infrastructure industry” (Trillas
and Montoya, p.18, 2008).
Accordingly, Samarajiva (2002) argues for the separation of regulatory
functions from political pressure. Bandaranayake (2005) supports this
view by insisting that the insulation of regulators from political
interference is a necessary pre-condition for the success of such a
regulator. While Adepetun (2011) agrees with this view within the
context of the Nigerian situation and contended that the degree of a
regulator’s independence generally facilitates its capacity to maintain
policy and regulatory stability that will enhance industry growth.
Therefore, creating a good and conducive regulatory environment is
critical toward achieving success.
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One of the major reasons of government’s presence in the
telecommunications industry is to ensure that most citizens have
access to telephone services at affordable costs. Additionally, due to
the importance of telecommunications to economic activities,
governments desire to control the industry in order to have a handle
on the entire economy.
However, industry complexities and present day realities make it
impossible for governments to continue in the industry as monopolies.
Thus liberalisation and privatisation ensued. In the view of Fink, Matoo
and Rathidran (2005, p.18), liberalisation and privatisation of
government-owned monopolies is beneficial. The authors argue that
“both privatisation and competition lead to significant improvement in
performance but a comprehensive reform program involving both
policies and the support of an independent regulation produce the
largest gains”. This therefore presupposes that industry liberalisation
through the introduction of competition is desirable for efficiency to be
achieved in the industry. There is also a strong argument that effective
industry monitoring and control needs to be established and
strengthened for good results to be guaranteed. This is feasible
through creating regulators that have some degree of independence
and freedom to operate without political interference. Smith (2000)
further observed that a regulator has two important functions: firstly,
to address issues related to market failure and secondly to create the
enabling environment for unhindered flow of investment into the
industry.
Meanwhile, the experiences and results of various countries with
respect to the effect of regulator independence differ. This may have
informed Dassler (2005, p.60) postulation that “embedding regulation
into state hierarchy and market environment allows for a better
understanding as to why regulator output differs across countries and
sectors”.
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The argument for independence of the regulator and the degree of
independence required for effective performance has been reported in
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) report of (1999, p.32) which
suggests that a regulator is considered independent when the
regulator is free from direct or indirect  influence of any telecom
service provider in a country. Impartiality and adherence to standards
in the best interest of public interest is considered as a necessary
indicator of regulator independence.  This will pave way for healthy
competition in the industry beneficial to the public.
The benefits of regulator independence as a driver of industry
transformation and growth was further explained by Wallsten (1999,
p.35) who confirmed that “Privatization combined with an independent
regulator is positively correlated with telecoms performance
measures”. Additionally, Wallsten (2007, p.7) stressed that “there is
some evidence indicating that most successful liberalisation of the
industry was achieved through the establishment of an independent
regulator”.
Furthermore, Baudrier (2001, p.16) argues that “Regulators are
usually thought of as part of the economic institutions of capitalism on
the one hand, the ultimate test of their efficacy lies in the impact they
have on performance. On the other hand, with the rise of
corporatisation and privatisations, the liberalization of various market
segments, and the change in the nature of services offered, the need
for a regulator as an independent referee becomes a necessity.”
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (2000a, p.44) also
supports this view by emphasising that regulator independence
facilitates industry competitiveness which drives industry expansion,
growth and development.
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Moreover, a study conducted by Trillas and Montoya (2008, p.31)
agreed that regulatory independence does permit growth. They argue
that “...........regulator independence is associated with higher network
penetration in Latin American and Caribbean telecommunications
markets, but the magnitude and statistical significance of this impact
are probably low and difficult to assess”.
Given the realisation that regulator independence is significant to
industry growth. This brings to the fore the question as to what level
degree of independence the regulator requires to operate optimally.
Complete independence may not be desirable due to the adverse
consequences it may have on regulator performance and industry
growth. This therefore necessitates having some measure of control
over the activities of the regulator. Then the essential issue shifts to
the measurement of regulator independence, how is the degree of
regulator independence determined and what elements are vital in
determining regulator independence?
2.4 MEASURING REGULATOR INDEPENDENCE
While there is a consensus on the independence of the regulator by
many scholars and industry practitioners, it remains difficult to
measure this independence of the regulator. This difficulty is
accentuated by the realisation that absolute regulator independence
may not be attainable or determinable. Wallsten, et al (2004, p.25)
amply captured this position and opined that “....but characterising a
regulating agency as either independent or not independent is
unrealistic.
No government agency is (or probably should be) completely
independent, and can more or less be independent across wide range
of issues”.
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In accordance, Melody (1997, p.42) opined that: “The term
'independence', as used in the context of telecoms reform is often
misunderstood. It does not imply independence from government
policy, or usurping the power to make policy, but rather independence
to implement policy without undue interference from politicians or
industry lobbyists”. Conversely, Wallsten, et al (2004, p.26) stressed
that “rather than ask whether a regulator is independent, we instead
ask many objective questions that can help determine how
independent a regulator is in different areas”.
Numerous authors have adopted different proxies to measure regulator
independence to suit their particular circumstances. For instance,
Gilardi (2003) developed a range of dimensions to measure regulator
independence by examining the credibility of the regulator. The author
sees credibility as an important indicator of independence and
constructed an independence index containing various indicators that
will explain credibility as a cursor to regulator independence. These
indicators include; the status of management, the status of board
members, financial independence, the relationship with the executive
and legislature. The author randomly assigned weights between 0 and
1 to identifiers where 0 represents no independence while 1 represents
absolute independence. The weights are then aggregated to arrive at a
final measure that will indicate regulatory independence or otherwise.
Gual (2003) for his part designed two independence indices based on
the following items; the duration and term of office of management
and board members, the level of financial independence of the
regulator, the appointment and termination of management and board
members, the level of responsibility of the regulator in terms of policy
issues, the reporting relationship between the regulator and the
legislature as well as the executive arms of government. Pedersen and
Sorensen (2004, p.9) developed independence indicators to measure
regulatory independence based on the following dimensions;
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independence in taking decisions, independence from government,
independence of stakeholders, and regulator autonomy.
The work of Gheventer (2003) created an independence index based
on the following measures: decision making autonomy, budgetary
independence, stability of leadership, designation process, technical
abilities, capability of enforcement and political interference. While Wu
(2004, p.35) on the other hand, developed a framework designed to
evaluate an agency’s independence that can be applied to the situation
of telecommunications regulators. These factors include:
• Stability of leadership: This concerns the manner in which the
leadership of the regulatory organisation is selected and
removed. It also concerns the tenure of office of key
management staff, the control and authority to make
appointments, the duration of appointment and the dismissal
process of all personnel responsible for key decision-
making/taking.
• Scope of its authority: This relates to those activities that
constitute the functions of the regulator and the degree to which
these functions are exclusively within the domain of the
regulator authority.
• Financial independence: This addresses the issue of how the
regulator is funded; whether the regulator is fully funded by the
executive arm of government or whether the regulator has the
authority to raise funds from other independent sources, and
whether the regulatory agency can financially sustain itself
without recourse to public funds.
• Ownership of incumbent: This refers to the level of privatisation
of the incumbent operator and the level of the state’s financial
interest in it.
• Movement of staff from industry to regulator: This concerns the
mobility of labour from regulator to operator. Personnel may be
43
less influenced by external interests if there is less mobility
between the regulator and private industry. However, some will
argue that flexibility in mobility of labour between the regulator
and the operators may aid deeper understanding of each other’s
operations.
• Representation of consumer concerns: The degree to which the
regulator can and does represent the interests of consumers.
• Ethical guidelines: This concerns the kind of guidelines existing
internally in the regulator’s realm of activities that deal with
ethical issues which arise in the course of normal operations.
Finally, Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, (1992) approached the
measurement of regulator independence through three dimensions as
follows; real independence measured by the tenure of office of
management and board members, formal independence measured by
the relationship between the regulator and the various arms of
government and relationship with the parent ministry.
Generally, it can be deduced from the measurement techniques
designed by various authors that measuring regulator independence is
popularly based on performance, financial independence, relationship
with executive and legislature as well as the appointment, tenure and
termination of key management and board members. The table below
summarises the contributions of some of the authors towards
measuring regulator independence.
Table 2.4 Authors contribution towards measuring regulator
independence
Author Measures/Indices/dimensions
Cukierman er. al
(1992)
Tenure of office of management and board members,
relationship with various arms of government.
Gilardi (2003) Regulator’s head status, board members’ status,
relationship with government and parliament as well as
financial and organisational autonomy.
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Gual (2003) Regulator responsibility over some policies, financial
budget  independence, mandate duration and reporting
relationships
Gheventer (2003) Budget autonomy, nomination process, technical
background, political interference and enforcement.
Pedersen &
Sorensen (2004)
Government independence, stakeholders independence,
decision-making independence and organisational
autonomy
Wu (2004) Stability of leadership, financial independence, scope of
authority, ownership of incumbent, movement of staff,
representation of consumer concern and ethical
guidelines.
However, a number of limitations have been observed relating to the
above metrics for determining the degree of a regulator’s
independence. For instance, according to Hanretty and Koop (2009,
p.10) “a regulator may possess a limited number of powers but
exercise them independently; or it may possess a wide range of
powers and exercise them with no independence”. This means that if
the indices determining independence include the extent of powers
over interconnection issues in the telecoms industry then a researcher
is no longer testing the impact of independence on interconnection
rates, but rather investigating the impact of having an independent
regulator with adequate powers which are relevant for the control of
connection rates.
Another limitation of these measures relates to the legal features
enshrined in some of the measurement indices. Since many of the
legal features used in the indices of independence determination are
considered essential, they are often addressed in the legislation which
establishes the regulatory agency.
Occasionally, however, certain points are not addressed in the
legislation. This is very often the case with provisions on dismissal,
reappointment, and term length. The absence of such provisions
affects the capacity or possibility of getting important information
about the degree of regulator independence. Hence, it may be that
legislation which lack provisions on term length is very often legislation
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which guarantees a low degree of regulator independence in that area
as well as in other areas.
Typically, however, the absence of such provisions is not included
separately in indices of independence, but is rather included alongside
other items in an assumed rank order. For example: Gilardi’s index has
an item about incompatibility between membership of the regulator’s
board and other government office. If the legislation does not specify
an incompatibility between board membership and other government
office, it is scored the same as legislation which states that board
membership and government office are compatible. These, however,
are not the same.
It may be the case that, in those countries in which politicians are
disposed to grant higher degree of independence to regulatory
agencies, it is simply assumed that no holder of government office
would take up such a position (Hanretty and Koop, 2009).
Counterfactually, as amply argued by Hanretty and Koop (2009) had
the law addressed this particular issue, it would have specified the
incompatibility. It is possible to object that there are strong subject-
specific reasons for assuming that any action not addressed by
legislation is permitted. After all, in a concrete situation in which the
independence of the regulator is threatened by a given action by
politicians, and where that action is not prohibited nor expressly
permitted by the relevant legislation, the regulator would hardly be
able to defend itself by saying that the relevant legislation would have
prohibited the action had it addressed it. Yet the treatment of
legislative gaps is not consistent across items.
For instance, Cukierman and Webb’s index of regulator independence
equates an absence of provisions regarding dismissal with a prohibition
of dismissal, whilst Gilardi’s and Elgie and McMenamin’s indices equate
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absence of provisions regarding dismissal with the permissibility of
dismissal (therefore, they arbitrarily assign it a score between
completely discretionary dismissal (which would at least be
consistent), and dismissal only for reasons unrelated to policy).  Thus,
although there is some presumption that the absence of provisions
regarding certain actions should be associated with lower degree of
regulator independence, this assumption should be tested instead of
being built into the index (Hanretty and Koop, 2009).
Additionally, the assumed order of response categories is another
source of conflict and is a limitation to the existing methods of
measuring the degree of regulator independence. This is because for
many items used as a measurement index, the order of response
categories makes intuitive sense for provisions on term length, that is,
if they are for the most part ordered in terms of their duration, a
natural quantity. Yet the majority of items do not follow a strongly
justified ordering. Many response categories, for example, are ordered
in terms of distance from the executive. Thus, regulators which take all
of their funding from the executive are scored less than regulators
which take only some of their funding from the executive. For many
items, this ordering makes sense in terms of its contribution in the
determination of the degree of regulator independence. For some
items, however, this ordering requires justification.
In the case of provisions on appointment, appointment by the
legislature is taken to signify a higher degree of independence than
appointment by the executive. However, if we are interested in
independence from politics and not from court, why is independence
from legislators any different to independence from cabinet ministers,
particularly in the modal case where a cabinet enjoys a majority in the
legislature? (Hanretty and Koop, 2009).
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Moreover, the involvement of the legislature may in certain respects
damage the regulator’s independence. The appointment systems
where multiple board members are appointed by parliament by
cumulative voting may allow each faction within the parliament to
appoint at its own ideal member, resulting in extremely partisan
boards. As Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) rightfully argue that to
circumvent this difficulty will require including or considering all the
number of actors involved in the appointment process, which at least
has a rationale in veto players theory, but which again requires further
elaboration. This raises the question of whether the legislature could
count as one actor or many and also the question on how the relative
strengths of these actors should be assessed and quantified. These
remarks are speculative, but do suggest that the ordering of response
categories, particularly in the field of appointments, must either be
strongly justified or tested (Hanretty and Koop, 2009).
The arbitrary weighting of items/nodes is also another source of
concern in the measurement of the degree of regulator independence
using the existing measurement indices. This is due to the fact that
most of the indices presented and discussed arbitrary assign weights
to index items or nodes composed of index items. This is most obvious
in the Cukierman-Webb index of regulator independence, where top-
level nodes are assigned weights ranging from 0.05 to 0.20, where
these weights were considered to be the "most plausible" by the
authors.
Only slightly less arbitrary is the decision of Elgie and McMenamin and
Gilardi to assign index nodes equal weights, justified by Gilardi (2002,
p.880) on the basis that equal weighting is the only defensible
weighting given ignorance about the relevant contribution of index
items/nodes. Indeed, going by the available information in the
literature it is possible to assume that no index of independence has
assigned weights to items on the basis of a reasoned assessment of
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the items’ relative contribution to independence (Hanretty and Koop,
2009).
Those measures which are closest to such a weighted index are those
measures which are based on the principal components of the agency
item matrix (Gual and Trillas, 2004; Edwards and Waverman, 2006),
which implicitly assigns greatest weight to those items which load most
on to the eigenvectors (Banaian, et al., 1998). This method of
weighting, however, treats category response scores as interval level
data, which could be incorrect as argued by Hanretty and Koop,
(2009).
Another subject of discussion in the measurement of the degree of
regulator independence is the area of assumed interval level of item
responses. This is true for items with multiple responses, where
response scores have typically been equally distributed along the
interval [0,1]. So, for an item dealing with reappointment provisions,
the three possible responses (re-appointment not permitted, re-
appointment permitted once, re-appointment permitted more than
once) are scored 1, 0.5, and 0 respectively. Yet there seems to be no
good reasons for assuming that permitting re-appointing once only
should be equidistant from permitting re-appointing more than once or
prohibiting re-appointment altogether. Indeed, there are good reasons
to assume that these items are not equally spaced. Permitting re-
appointment is assumed to damage independence insofar as principals
can use the threat of non-reappointment to coerce their agents.
But the value of re-appointment to existing agents may be reduced if
they have already served two terms (they may wish to retire or move
to another position). Consequently, the assumed damage to
independence between permitting re-appointment once and permitting
re-appointment multiple times may be less, and the distance between
permitting re-appointing multiple times and permitting re-appointment
once should be less than the distance between permitting re-
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appointment once and not permitting re-appointment (Hanretty and
Koop, 2009).
In an attempt to reduce the effect of the outlined limitations on the
measurement of the degree of regulator independence, the majority of
the authors believe that the best solution would be for researchers
dealing with aggregate indices to employ a subset of the measures
typically used until now. That is, items relating to the appointing body
for agency chief executives and agency boards should be removed.
Items relating to the competences or powers of regulators should also
be removed from indices of independence; otherwise researchers
should admit that these indices are not measuring statutory
independence but more likely measuring some domain-specific mixture
of statutory independence and adequacy of instruments relative to
some goal. Additionally, when coding regulators, researchers should
not assume that the absence of provisions regarding some action
signifies its permissibility. Rather, the absence of provisions should be
treated as missing data (Hanretty and Koop, 2009).
It is evident from the various measures and their limitations that
quantifying regulator independence is a very difficult task due to the
subjective nature of “independence” itself. This notwithstanding, it is
important to collect, quantify and analyse data based on insights from
qualitative interviews directed toward determining the degree of
regulator independence.
Although regulator independence is important, it is also essential that
a regulator is held accountable for its responsibilities in order to avoid
abuse. Besides determining the degree of a regulator’s independence,
it is vital to examine the level of control exercised by the government
on behalf of the public. This is because regulator independence without
accountability may adversely affect the effective and efficient
achievement of regulatory objectives.
50
2.5 INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
REGULATOR
Effective regulation that supports sustainable investment requires
some independence from political influences, especially on a day-to-
day or decision-by-decision basis. The regulatory body must be an
impartial, transparent, objective and non-partisan enforcer of
government-determined policies by means set out in controlling
statutes of the regulator, free of transitory political influences. The
regulator should also be independent from the industry that supplies
ICT services (Cukierman, et. al, 1992).
Furthermore, well performing regulators should have other qualities
apart from being independent. These qualities include being
transparent, accountable and predictable. Moreover, the regulator
should be clearly separated from other regulators and the supervising
ministry. For a regulator to be effective its independence must be
balanced with accountability. This is to deter the regulator from being
inefficient or corrupt. The public are entitled to information regarding
the activities of the regulator and should have a means of seeking
redress in the event of the regulator acting incompetently or
arbitrarily. There is a strong need to create measures that will ensure
the attainment of a balance between regulator independence and
accountability. Trillas and Montoya (2008, p.10) identified some of
these measures to include;
1. Regulator performance review by independent auditors or the
legislature
2. Making sure that the decisions taken by the regulator are
subject to review by the court of law.
3. Making publications available to the public with respect to
various laws and statutes relating to the regulator. The
publications need to identify the regulators goals, rights, duties,
obligations and responsibilities.
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4. Publication of annual report by the regulator on its activities
5. Asking the regulator to publish its major decisions
6. Creating procedures and rules for the appointment and removal
of regulator officials. Especially removal of officials found to be
incompetent, corrupt or in cases of misconduct.
7. Interested parties should be allowed to make representations on
issues being reviewed by the regulator which affects them or
others (Trillas and & Montoya, 2008, p.10).
Furthermore, regulator’s accountability should be appropriately in
tandem with regulator independence. However, striking the proper
balance between independence and accountability could be extremely
if not notoriously difficult. To overcome this difficulty the following
measures have been adopted and proposed by a growing number of
experts in the literature, including but not limited to Mwenda (2006,
p.60); Eberhard, (2007, p.45); Baez and Kechiche (2010, p.8). These
authors argue that the following measures are necessary in
establishing accountability of an independent regulator:
• The pursuit of transparency through the publication of major
decisions taken by the regulator: This is to ensure that the
regulator operates openly in a transparent manner.
• Avoidance of conflicting interests: This relates to ensuring that
conflict of interest does not exist among executive officers of the
regulator where they may have a stake in some operators whom
they are meant to regulate.
• Providing effective arrangements for appealing the regulator’s
decisions: In situations where the aggrieved operators are not
satisfied a means of making an appeal an obtaining justice
should be available. This is to prevent regulators from having
absolute authority or rather abusing their authority to regulate
the industry.
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• Regulator’s budget review and control by the legislature: This
will provide a means of checking regulator financial excesses
when they occur. Moreover absolute control over funding by the
regulator may have negative consequences in terms of
preventing influences of the operators in the decisions taken by
the regulator that affect such operators.
• Review of regulator’s activities by public organisations
(watchdogs) and external auditors: This is a very good means of
ensuring that the regulator remains accountable. Professional
external auditors without any interest in the industry except on
arm’s length relationship with other industry operators
• Permitting the regulator’s removal from office in cases of proven
misconduct or incapacity: Conducting the affairs of the regulator
in a disciplined manner without undue political interference.
Clearly, an analysis of regulatory independence must pay particular
attention to the accountability of the institutions. Measurement of
accountability such as public availability of regulatory decisions, and
budget is essential for understanding regulatory independence. The
issue of regulator independence and accountability raises further
questions on the sustenance of regulator independence. A high degree
of control from the parent ministry of the regulator may gradually
erode the independence of the regulator or limit such independence to
the extent that it hampers the effective and efficient performance of
regulatory functions. Other issues of regulator independence
sustainability relate to the controversy over whether a single national
regulator or separate type of regulator is the most appropriate for
independence sustenance.
2.6 SUSTAINING INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGULATOR
There is a raging debate among authors over whether more
independence is achieved by having a single national regulator that
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deals with regulation or by having separate regulators that deal with
each industry. Anders, Samarajiva & Melody (2003) argue that the
main threat for the political independence of the telecommunications
regulator come from the line ministry who act as the supervisory
regulator, policy maker and also as an operator. In some instances
multi-sector regulation is in place in some countries where the
regulator is under the control of more than one ministry.
This makes it difficult for a single ministry to interfere with the affairs
of the regulator. A multi-sector regulator also provides advantages
such as sharing of knowledge across industries and sharing of valuable
human resources for regulation which are scarce in developing
countries.
The most significant disadvantage a multi-sector regulator may
encounter is that the pace of reform and liberalisation may vary
significantly in different sectors (TTR-ITU, 2002). Also there is a high
risk in the case of a failure of a multi-sector regulator because the
failure of the single regulator will affect all the industries controlled by
that regulator.
To sustain regulator independence, it is imperative to maintain
professionalism through ensuring that professional qualifications are
made mandatory for the staff of the regulator. It is equally important
that the following are ensured: independent budget and employee
recruitment activities, public reporting of government communications
to and from the regulator, public accountability and the appointment of
several commissioners with fixed tenured terms rather than a single
term. This will create and sustain a desirable degree of independence
from government total control and influence (Melody, 1997).
According to TTR-ITU (2002), the key to actually achieving and
maintaining independence is legitimacy; that is, the acceptance of the
existence and the power of an entity by those who can affect it or are
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affected by it. Because legitimacy is won and perpetuated through
communicative processes it is critical that the regulator maintain
constant public awareness of their activity. True independence requires
the regulator to act and be seen to act in the public interest. Results
must not only be achieved but they must be seen to be achieved as
well.
The human capital in the regulatory body is of utmost importance to
sustain its credibility and independence. Having competent people in
the regulatory body ensures that legally and technically correct
decisions are made in implementing the policies. The categories of
skills needed in a regulatory body include engineering, law, economics,
accounting/finance and management (Melody, 2003).
It is also important that the hiring and firing of the staff in the
regulatory body be kept within the body (Cowhey and Klimenco,
2001). Providing adequate compensation is a necessary basis for
attracting and retaining expertise. However the gap between the salary
structures of public and private sector could be a major obstacle
towards using compensation as a basis for attracting and retaining
good staff by the regulator. Consequently, this may affect the
capability of a regulator to sustain its independence based of the
quality of their human capital. The regulator could as a result use
training as an attractive opportunity for employees to grow and
develop, which would motivate staff to remain in service for longer
periods thus enhancing its capacity to sustain its independence (TTR-
ITU, 2002).
The leader of the regulatory authority should also have sufficient
authority and autonomy if the regulatory body is to function
independently. Independence derives from things such as whether the
leader can be removed easily by the executive, whether the leader has
a fixed term in office and if that term is long enough. If the leader
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cannot be removed no matter what decision is made and the term in
office is fixed or for life, then that person can make independent
decisions not bending to political pressure (Wu, 2004). However, this
sort of absolute independence in appointment and tenure of the
regulator’s leader is often open to abuse: such a leader may easily
become a dictator.
The authority of the regulator is another important criterion where the
regulator’s independence is indicated. It is also a significant source of
sustenance of regulator independence. For instance, where the
regulator has the authority to grant licences for cellular operators in
places where frequency is a scarce resource it implies independence of
the regulator as Wu (2004) argues. However the author has shown in
his study that a lot of regulators do not have this authority but they
are given the authority to issue licences in the fixed line market where
there is no issue of scarce resources.
In this case the regulator is considered operationally or partially
independent. The authority of a partially independent regulator in this
circumstance could be withdrawn, thereby affecting the capacity of the
regulator to sustain its independence. Min (2000) is of the opinion that
the ministry rather than the regulator should have the authority to
grant licences to mobile operators because the limited spectrum is
considered a national asset that should be allocated at the highest
level. This argument suggests taking away one of the key functions a
regulator performs in the telecoms industry, and by so doing
undermining the regulator’s independence.
The source of funding is one more key determinant of regulator
independence and its sustainability. Best practice is to earn the funding
through its own operations, otherwise the funding organisation
(usually the government) could influence the decisions of the regulator
during the budget process (Wu, 2004). Imposing a requirement that all
56
communication between the regulator and the government be
documented also improves the capacity to sustain the independence of
the regulator by making it difficult for the government to issue orders
which are politically motivated (Cowhey and Klimenco, 2001).
While creating one regulator per industry may expedite the decision
process, having a board of regulators depersonalises the regulatory
process (Cowhey and Klimenco, 2001). On the other hand, a board of
regulators may have difficulty in sustaining its independence due to
the associated complexities in the regulation of several industries by
the same regulator. Reporting is another area that has impact on
independence, as this affects the accountability requirement of a
regulator.
It is evident from the foregoing that sustaining the independence of a
regulator be very difficult given the penchant of government to
intervene politically when things are not working according to plan or
often in order to shore up the dwindling popularity of the government.
These political interventions create complexities and bring to the fore
the various challenges of the lack of regulator independence and the
effect of such a situation on the growth and development of the
industry.
2.7 CHALLENGES OF THE LACK OF REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE
The challenges facing regulator independence are enormous, often
leading to non-performance or failure in achieving regulatory
objectives and the general policy aims of greater connectivity,
penetration and utilisation. This was clearly enunciated by Wallsten
(2002), who found a negative correlation between the independence of
the regulator and the number of mainlines and mainlines per capita.
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This means that more independent regulation has resulted in less
penetration of fixed line telephony.
Conversely, Wallsten (2002) puts forward two ideas that may explain
his finding. First, the variable ‘independence’ was measured as a direct
question from the regulator if it was independent.
This could have resulted in a situation where the regulator could have
been biased to answer yes, because it depicts a fairer regulatory
environment as advocated by World Bank, WTO, etc. Therefore the
variable could have been plainly wrong and misleading. The second
situation Wallsten (2002) refers to is that too much independence from
political influence can be harmful because ideally the consumer
preferences are represented through the political system, at least in a
democracy.
Therefore a fully independent regulator (from the government) may
not be advocating what is best for people of the country. Rather the
regulator could be strongly influenced by the private sector operators
for their own benefit and can operate closely with the regulator
carefully controlling the flow of information (Samarajiva and
Dokedeniya, 2005). Such a situation is rampant in Nigeria where a
former managing director of the privatised incumbent (NITEL) was
appointed as the head of the regulating body and decisions clearly
favouring the incumbent were taken.
No matter how independent the regulator is, it is still a government
agency. The regulator has to act with close co-operation with the
policy maker to implement the policies of the government effectively
(Min, 2000). Therefore it is best to grant the correct degree of
independence the regulator will require to effectively and efficiently
carry on its functions. This should be done while taking into cognisance
the country’s social and political environment. However, achieving a
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correct degree of regulator independence is often mired by several
constraints.
2.8 CONSTRAINTS OF ACHIEVING REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE
Since telecommunication service provision is a driver for economic
growth it is high on government’s agenda, although it is also a
politically sensitive issue. Because of the sensitivity of the industry
various governments like to keep close supervision of industry
regulators.
Governments in many countries may also continue to hold significant
shares in incumbent operators. This relationship between the
government and the incumbent increases the chances of the
government taking various measures to protect the incumbent’s
market share through the regulator (Melody, 1997). Some
governments do this to maximise returns when the incumbent is
subsequently privatised. The action of government with respect to the
incumbent is a formidable constraint towards achieving a reasonable
degree of regulator independence.
Another constraint to regulator independence concerns the activities of
industry operators, including the incumbent who will try their best to
influence the regulator to make policies in their favour. These
operators may often resort to kickbacks to bribe the regulators. This is
especially possible in developing countries, particularly in Nigeria
where corruption is very high.
Generally, attaining the most effective degree of regulator
independence is difficult because of the complex objectives of
regulation which can be categorised into three main aims: to protect
consumers from abuse by firms with substantial market power; to
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protect investors and investments from poor government decisions,
thereby promoting efficiency in economic activities.
While there is growing recognition by some segments of the literature
that competition can reduce the needs for regulation in the telecoms
industry, most experts believe that competition in the telecoms
industry needs regulation. This is because the industry contains some
areas of monopoly where the benefits of regulation potentially
outweigh the costs (Cowhey and Klimenco, 2001).
Regulating the telecoms industry becomes complicated if these three
related considerations are put into perspective. Firstly, prices for
telecoms services could be usually political in the sense that the lower
the prices of telecoms services the more possibility of an elected
representative being re-elected on the strength of facilitating the
existence of lower prices. This first scenario is only applicable is
situations of a government monopoly in the industry.
However, the introduction of competition in the industry which
heralded the arrival of many private sector operators into the industry
has made it unlikely for price control to rest solely and exclusively on
the shoulders of the government or the operators (Cowhey and
Klimenco, 2001). Secondly, the authors further argue that credibility
and proper rules must be established and strictly adhered to for
investors to have any measure of confidence to take any serious
investment decisions in a telecom industry. Therefore an independent
regulator will be faced with difficult decisions for the betterment of the
industry. Finally, the authors conclude that the regulator will have to
pursue the goal of flexibility due to the dynamic nature of the telecom
industry and the goals of economic efficiency in addition to other
regulatory objectives for the industry to thrive through foreign or local
investments.
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All these are a source of concern with respect to the independence of a
regulator. This is because it creates the opportunity for consistent
government intervention in the affairs of the regulator which
undermines regulator independence by obstructing the effective and
efficient performance of its regulatory functions. This then brings to
fore the question as to what constitutes regulatory functions and
regulator independence.
2.9 REGULATORY FUNCTIONS AND REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE
Several authors agree that anti competitive practices are very common
in an industry like the telecoms where there has been an initial
monopoly and competition is subsequently introduced. This is mainly
because it is very easy for a dominant player to take advantage of its
dominant position at the expense of other operators.
One regulatory practice used to mitigate this problem is to use
asymmetric regulation where a burden and certain obligations are
imposed upon the dominant carrier (Min, 2000). The promotion of
competition is considered significant in removing the disadvantages
suffered by new operators in such industry. High licence fees and high
interconnection fees can constitute a formidable barrier to entry for
new comers to the industry. Furthermore, the customers can be
encouraged to choose any operator they like by such practices such as
number portability. Number portability means that the customer can
subscribe to any operator while keeping the same number without
having to change the number.
Moreover, ensuring that everyone has access to telephone services can
be a difficult goal to achieve especially in rural areas. The provision of
services to rural areas can be very capital intensive because of the low
density. Secondly the revenue generated can be low because the rural
communities who are normally poorer will not originate calls as
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frequently as more affluent customers. It was discovered that the cost
of terminating a call in a rural area is many times higher than
terminating it in a city (Samarajiva, 2002a).
While the provision of services to rural areas can be achieved through
cross subsidisation, this may be anti-competitive since other operators
cannot match the prices achieved through cross-subsidisation by an
incumbent government telecoms company. To solve a problem of this
nature, the regulator can either remove price ceilings in the specific
area so that the prices reveal the true cost of provision of service, or
make use of government subsidies on a tender basis. Regulating the
prices can be achieved in two different ways: price cap regulation and
rate of return regulation.
Price cap regulation involves setting a maximum price so that the
operators set their own prices equal or lower that this maximum. Rate
of return regulation uses cost of operations or service provision plus a
reasonable margin of profit to determine prices. The price cap is
usually reviewed periodically and the operators can improve their
productivity and efficiency to increase their profit margins.
Rate of return regulation means the regulator sets a percentage
perceived as fair in the industry as the rate of return for the operators.
The operators have to adjust the prices so that the rate of return does
not exceed the stipulated amount (Samarajiva, 2002a).
Even though managing the radio spectrum is regarded as part of the
regulator’s responsibilities, Min (2000) argues that spectrum allocation
is a policy issue normally decided at higher levels, and the regulator
should only retain the function of allocating the licence based on the
chosen spectrum. Allocating numbers to operators is also considered
an important regulatory function. Also the regulator has the
responsibility to monitor the service quality provided by the operator.
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This includes collection of data such as call completion ratios and fault
repair times (Min, 2000).
The regulator is apparently assigned the enormous responsibilities of
ensuring fairness among operators as well as protecting the consumer
from exploitation by industry operators. It is therefore vital that a
regulator has a reasonable degree of independence to perform it
functions and create a consumer driven industry.
2.10 CONSUMER-DRIVEN REGULATION AND REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE
Consumers of telecoms products and services have many wants and
desires that they expect to be satisfied. It is in this vein that Walker
(2001, p.54) defines the purpose of telecoms industry regulations as
“to achieve those desirable and justified outcomes for consumers and
the community as a whole that do not arise naturally from the
market”. Accordingly, Smith (2000) posits that there are two main
objectives to telecoms industry regulation which included addressing
all issues relating to failure of the market in the telecom service
delivery and the objective of creating the enabling environment that
will generate a good of flow of investments. In addition to this Walker
(2001) argues that the three most critical needs for telecoms industry
regulation are to protect customers, to ensure fair competition and to
promote competition. For the telecoms industry regulator to have the
capability of achieving these customer satisfaction objectives, a degree
of regulator independence is necessary.
Furthermore, as expressed by Thakur, et al (2006, p.30), “Having an
independent regulator can also lead to increased confidence both
among consumers and investors”.  This implies indirect measurement
of the perception of market players could provide a proxy to regulatory
independence. A number of authors have constructed various
variables/indicators that measure customer satisfaction with service
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delivery. Accordingly, Bandaranayake (2005, p.21) identified some of
these variables to include:
1. Quality of service (QoS) given by the change in subscriber base,
turnaround time, ease of interconnectivity, operational flexibility
as well as speed of service.
2. The quality of operator personnel indicating and their technical
capabilities to resolve problems quickly.
3. Customer services
4. Prices of interconnectivity
5. Complaint resolution
6. Consumer protection laws (Bandaranayake, 2005 p. 21).
The various sections presented above discussed several issues
surrounding regulator independence in general. The subsequent
section of this chapter examines the issue of regulator independence in
the telecoms industry of Nigeria.
2.11 CONCLUSION
The chapter surveyed various literature connected to the significance
of regulator independence in telecoms sector growth and development.
The chapter explored the issues of regulation, regulator independence,
regulator independence and accountability, measurement and
sustenance of regulator independence, challenges and constraints to
regulator independence, structure and governance for regulator
independence, consumer-driven regulation and regulator
independence, regulatory functions and regulator independence, as
well as regulator independence in the Nigeria telecoms industry.
The surveyed literature clearly established the significance of regulator
independence as a necessary condition for the growth and
development of industry including the telecoms sector. However,
absolute independence or lack of independence is considered harmful
to the industry. Therefore, the achievement of regulator objectives and
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the growth and development of the industry are directly and indirectly
associated with the degree of regulator independence in carrying out
its regulatory responsibilities. This is also found to be reasonably the
case with respect to the telecoms industry situation in Nigeria. This
review therefore informed the best methodology to carry out the study
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DATA GENERATION
AND EVALUATION APPROACH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This study examines the degree of regulator independence and the
effect of such independence on access, usage, pricing, competition,
quality of telecoms services and consumer satisfaction in Nigeria, using
a qualitative measure of the perception of stakeholders in the industry.
The methodology employed for this study focuses on establishing the
impact of regulator independence in the growth and development of
the Nigerian telecommunications industry. The study used data
obtained from primary and secondary sources. Qualitative approach
was deployed in classifying, codifying, evaluating and interpreting the
information obtained.
3.2 MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENCE
Discussions of desirable institutional arrangements for effective
regulation of utility industries are now numerous and include: Brown,
Stern, Tenebaum and Gencer (2006), Melody (1997), Smith (2000),
Green (1999), Estache (2003), Kerf et al. (2001), Mustafa (2002),
Smith and Wellenius (1999), Stern (1997), and Stern and Holder
(1999).
The most frequent variable examined is regulatory independence which
is often simply characterised by a proxy variable − such as whether a
country has a separate regulatory agency not directly under the
control of the ministry. For example, Wallsten (2002, p.112) uses a
proxy to determine whether a country has established a separate
regulatory authority and observes that this variable is “better
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characterized as indicating a country’s propensity to undertake
regulatory reforms rather than the effect of a separate regulator per
se”. Wallsten relies on subjective responses by regulatory authorities
to the question of whether they considered themselves “independent
from political power.” Other studies that make use of a proxy variable
include Gutierrez and Berg (2000), Fink, et al. (2002) and Bauer
(2005).
However, there have also been subsequent design and deployment of
wider measures of regulatory quality and independence by many more
authors. Gutierrez (2003a, b) constructs a regulatory framework index
that is composed of an equally weighted sum of the presence of six
institutional elements that are perceived to have a bearing on good
regulatory governance. The elements are; separation between the
incumbent operator and regulatory activities, independence from
government, accountability measured by the existence of mechanisms
to resolve disputes between regulators and operators, clarity of the
regulator’s roles and objectives as well as transparency and
participation in the regulatory process especially in determining
whether the creation of the regulatory body is backed by legislation
rather than by executive decree.
On their part, Gual and Trillas (2006) constructed a more detailed
index of regulatory features bearing specifically on regulatory
independence from government. While focusing on the determinants
of policy reforms (rather than the outcomes of regulatory reform) their
work provides a useful example of measuring the multi-dimensional
nature of the reform process in telecommunications. They focus on
entry barriers (including the degree to which market opening or
deregulation policies are asymmetric, or biased in favour or against
entrants) in addition to the degree of independence (vis-à-vis their
governments) of regulatory authorities. They present new indices, both
for entry barriers and for independence.
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Edwards and Waverman (2006) for their part use a composite
regulatory performance indicator. The various efforts of experts
notwithstanding, it should be noted that it may be difficult to precisely
measure the degree of independence of a regulator on the basis of the
existing methodology and proxies alone. This is because these proxies
are predominantly formal thus excluding the effect of informal
activities that may have a bearing on a regulators independence or
otherwise. The table below shows a summary of the measurement
indices designed by various authors as shown in the literature.
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Table 3.2: Telecommunications Industry Regulatory
Independence Indices
Author Variables Methodology
Cukierman
et al
(1992)
• Nomination rules
• Final objectives
• Decision-making process
• Policy formulation
• Limitation
• Weight
each
variable ad
hoc
• Simple
and
weighted
averages as
indicators
Gual
(2003)
• Agency responsibility over some policies
• Financial budget independence
• Mandate duration
• Reporting relationships
Simple
weighted
averages of
results
Gilardi
(2003)
• Agency head status
• Board members status
• Relationship with government and
parliament
• Financial and organisational autonomy
Each indicator
is analysed
ranging from 0
and 1 followed
by a simple
average
aggregation
Gutierrez
(2003a, b)
• Separation of regulator and incumbent
• Independence from government
• Accountability
• Clarity of roles
• Transparency
Gheventer
(2003)
• Budget autonomy
• Nomination process
• Technical background
• Political interference
• Enforcement
Simple average
of the variables
ranging
between 0 and
1
Pedersen &
Sorensen
(2004)
• Government independence
• Stakeholders independence
• Decision-making independence
Simple average
of the four
dimensions,
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• Organisational autonomy ranging
between 0 and
1
Wu (2004)
• Stability of leadership
• Financial independence
• Scope of authority
• Ownership of incumbent
• Movement of staff
• Representation of consumer concern
• Ethical guidelines
Simple
weighted
averages
Gual and
Trillas
(2006)
• Entry barrier indicators
- Entry conditions
- Number of operators
- Spectrum allocation
- Number portability
- Carrier selection
- Loop unbundling
• Independence indicators
- Technical competence
- Financial independence
- Reporting relationships
- Appointment, tenure and dismissal
of top executives and board
members
- Incumbents ownership structure
- Length of operations
Simple
weighted
average
3.3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS BASED ON TELECOMS
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (TRE)
The qualitative analysis for this study will be partly drawn from the
Telecommunications Regulatory Environment (TRE) survey method.
This method generates and measures industry stakeholder’s perception
of the regulatory environment in a country.
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It uses the Likert Scale of measurement along several dimensions
where weights are assigned to responses based on strength of
respondent’s convictions. Further evaluation and generalisations are
made that subsequently provide an explanation with respect to a
phenomena or a given situation.
The justification for using this survey for this study is based on the fact
that the TRE survey technique has universal appeal and acceptability
as a method for evaluating regulatory performance. As explained by
Samarajiva et. al (2007, p.23) the TRE survey technique is designed
to be used in different regulatory environments. It can be adopted and
modified to accommodate different characteristics without losing its
potency as a survey instrument. The technique is also designed to
allow for benchmarking of countries over time. TRE scores can be used
to measure positive or negative regulatory environment in different
countries.
Furthermore, the TRE survey technique permits performance
assessment of telecom sector regulatory laws. This can be done by
allocating scores that will represent various performance levels. The
TRE scores are designed in such a way that low values represent poor
performance, medium values represent satisfactory performance and
high values represent performance improvement. In the event of low
scores improvement in regulatory performance will be desirable. The
TRE technique is also useful in assessing a country’s regulatory risk by
prospective investors. This technique is especially useful in identifying
country regulatory risk for international investors with interests in the
telecom industry of numerous countries. The TRE survey technique
was created to measure the effects of regulatory activities on
investments by Samarajiva and Dokeniya (2005).
This survey technique measures the regulatory environment of the
telecoms industry using five indicators (allocation of scarce resources,
market entry, universal service obligation, interconnection, and
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regulation of anti-competitive practices). A further dimension for tariff
regulation was later included. In keeping with the changing nature of
the telecoms sector, new dimensions and new sectors are being
constantly added. Due to the nature of the TRE survey technique
questions are designed carefully because the ideal respondents to this
survey method are mostly senior managers, including CEOs of
operators, board members, and top managers. TRE uses very short
questions to determine the perceptions of key players because too
many questions could tire out the respondents thus creating possible
problems of reliability and credibility of responses elicited.
A Likert scale method with values ranging from 1 to 5 usually
employed in the TRE survey technique. This facilitates making analysis
of the data generated whilst still retaining the capability to obtain
qualitative information. This reason, along with the flexibility and
practicality of application of the TRE survey method, provided the
impetus for its selection as the main survey method for this study over
other methodologies.
For instance, in contrast, the European Competitive
Telecommunications Association (ECTA) regulatory scorecard method
developed to assess similar situations, has several shortcomings that
make it inadequate for deployment in this study. This is because
despite the ECTA’s regulatory scorecard being quite comprehensive in
its coverage, it only benchmarks the telecoms regulatory framework in
22 European countries. The framework is constructed to suit only
European countries and in essence it cannot be implemented outside
the EU.
The ECTA scorecard is a questionnaire designed to cover the following
areas: the total institutional environment, major enablers for market
entry and network roll out, National Regulatory Authorities (NRA)
regulatory processes, application of regulation by the NRA and
regulatory and market outcomes. The ECTA questionnaire and
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methodology are generally compiled following consultations with NRAs,
ECTA members and the European Regulators Group (ERG) and also
take account of the requirements and recommendations contained in
the EU regulatory framework, the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
reference paper on telecommunications, and European Commission
and ERG Guidelines. The key variables used for the ECTA survey
include but are not limited to the followings items presented in the
table below:
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Table 3.3: The European Competitive Telecommunications
Association (ECTA) survey variables
Variables Regulator –
General
Functions
Dispute
Settlement
Body
General Market
Access
conditions
Key Access
products
Indicators Speed of
process
Speed of process Access obligations Narrow band
voice
Transparency Due process Non discrimination
and price squeeze
Voice
Powers and
sanctions
Effectiveness of
sanctions and
scale of
resources
Price control Business
Scale of
resources
Effectiveness of
appeal procedure
Cost accounting
separation
Broadband
Effectiveness of
appeal
procedure
- Rights of way and
facility sharing
-
Independence - Numbering -
Market analysis
procedure and
imposition of
remedies
- - -
Source: ECTA (2009, 2007)
The weight is given to each of these main sections is a reflection of
their respective importance in delivering the set objectives. A
subsequent comparison of variables and weights will be made to
produce a set of results.
The ECTA survey technique is exclusively created to serve the needs of
countries located in the European Community (EC). The technique is
useful this region because they share common institutional and legal
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framework. The ECTA survey technique poses questions specific to the
EC regulatory environment. This makes the adoption of the ECTA
survey technique difficult if not impossible by countries outside the EC.
This shortcoming of the ECTA technique has been subject of criticism
especially with regards to the method employed in the assignment of
weights used in assessing the regulatory environment (Samarajiva, et
al. (2009), (2007); Weeks and Williamson (2006); Edwards and
Waverman (2006).
Further criticisms of the ECTA survey technique came from Weeks and
Williamson (2006) who see the method as not being clear on the
difference between effective regulation and increased regulation
especially when competitive market conditions are involved. Therefore,
for the purpose of this research emphasis shall be placed on universal
service obligations, accessibility, quality of service and
interconnectivity. The TRE method of assessment was employed for
evaluation of responses to be generated from data collected through
primary sources. The following variables were considered in sector
performance in relation to regulator independence in Nigeria:
1. Governance of the regulator with regards to the stability of
the staff, leadership, scope of authority of board members,
appointments, financial independence and remuneration.
This is inspired by Brown et al (2006) where he clearly
pointed out that evaluation of both governance and
substance is important.
2. Regulator performance with respect to universal access
interconnectivity, incentive pricing, fair competition, QoS,
consumer protection and access to resources such as
numbering and spectrum.
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The above were measured against the performance of the sector
including the penetration of fixed, mobile, internet and broadband
services over the last decade.
3.4 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The method of data collection employed was a structured interview.
This is in line with Huysamen (1993, p.26) and Baxter and Jack (2008)
who suggest that interviews should be used when a researcher
attempts to elicit opinions. Babbie (2004, p.273) also suggested that
interviews should be used as the primary source of data collection for
qualitative research methodologies, as they generally produce fewer
incomplete answers. The interview schedule adopted for this study
contains a mix of questions that are predominantly open-ended
questions with exhaustive response categories as well as a few
mutually exclusive closed-ended questions. This approach is expected
to ensure greater uniformity of the responses received and also allows
for easier data analysis in line with the Babbie (2004, p.25)
suggestion. The interview is also structured on the basis of Creswell’s
(2003, p.188) suggestion that qualitative researchers should use the
following identified interview components and interview questions:
• A heading.
• Opening statements
• Probes to follow key questions.
• Transition messages for the interviewer.
• Space for recording the interviewer’s comments.
• Space for recording reflective notes.
A pilot survey was conducted to pre-test the interview questions. This
is in line with established practice in the literature, as Babbie (2004,
p.256) succinctly stated that “no matter how carefully researchers
design a data collection instrument such as interview questions, there
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is always the possibility of error”. In order to protect against such
errors, a pilot survey was conducted to pre-test the interview
questions for any errors and incoherence. The survey was tested on a
randomly selected sample that is considered representative of the
research population. As Babbie (2004, p.256) suggested that it is
necessary to choose a representative sample to conduct the pilot
survey. The main output of the pilot survey from the test subjects
provided information about the order and grouping of the questions
needed to be improved to enable better readability and flow of the
questions.
3.5 PRIMARY DATA
Primary data in this study was obtained through conduct of interviews.
Respondents from the regulator, the operators, government policy
makers, educational institutions and customers were identified and
interviewed. Interviews were conducted in order to elicit the opinion of
experts, high-ranking officials of the regulator and policy makers in
order to determine the effect of regulator independence on the growth
and development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria.
3.6 SECONDARY DATA
Data was also obtained from secondary sources consisting of
magazines, company reports, books, journal, publications, government
bulletins, news items, academic work and written reports from credible
sources including the website of NITEL, NCC, CBN, statistical bureau,
operators, ITU, WTO, the World Bank and IMF. Data about sector
performance were also available from RIA sector performance reviews
and the Nigerian Communication Commission. These sources were
used for a content analysis where arguments of various experts on the
significance of regulator independence on the growth and development
of the telecommunications industry will be harnessed.
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Websites were also surveyed to provide information with respect to the
growth of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. The financial
report that appears on the NCC website was reviewed to view funding
capacity and relationship with the government. This is an important
determinant of independence.
3.7 DESCRIPTIVE INDICATORS
This study used two sets of descriptive indicators in order to assess the
regulatory independence and sector performance.
3.7.1 Regulator independence indicators
Regulator independence is considered significant in order for the
regulator to achieve its objectives. As argued by Baudrier (2001,
p.34) regulatory independence will “ensure that the regulatory role will
be carried out effectively, free from the short-term interests of
agents”. The determination of regulator independence is the first step
before examining the effect of the independence or otherwise on the
telecoms industry development in Nigeria. Based on the analysis of
several variables that are used elsewhere, the following variables have
been identified to provide a meaningful tool of determining regulator
independence in Nigeria.
3.7.1.1 Relationship between policy making and regulation
The separation of the policy making function and the regulating
function is necessary to ensure effectiveness in performance and the
achievement of the desired objectives of the policy. As indicated in the
literature, there is a need to have written policy guidelines to steer the
policy executor in the right direction.
The policy maker, which is often the government, has to indicate to
the regulator the policy direction, and if this is done through written
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policy guidelines the process becomes transparent and legitimate to
other stake-holders. The existence of written guidelines by the policy
makers makes the independence of the regulator clear in the opinion
of experts. This is also a good indicator of regulatory independence.
3.7.1.2 Appointment and tenure of board members
The process of appointment and tenure of board members of the
regulator is a necessary indicator of stability and freedom to exercise
responsibility without undue influence.
3.7.1.3 Appointment and tenure of executive officers of the
regulator
Stability of leadership positions is crucial in conveying to industry
operators a sense of purpose and seriousness on the part of
regulators. This also means that regulators are protected from undue
political pressures and meddling. A clear indicator of regulator
independence is the process of appointment and removal of regulatory
agency leadership, tenure in office and the existence and duration of
fixed term of office.
3.7.1.4 Funding
This is where issues relating to government subventions against
internally generated funds of the regulator were examined in order to
ascertain the level of autonomy/independence of the regulatory
agency. The autonomy/independence of a regulatory organisation
strengthens its authority. A regulatory body is regarded as
independent when it has control over its source of resources.
As rightly argued by Pedersen and Sorensen (2004, p.9), “An
organisation has more autonomy when it controls its resources. Thus,
a stable source of resources, as a fee charged to the regulated industry
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and the authority to control assignment; promotion and salary policies,
are considered to be important resources.” Moreover, experts agree
that the independence of a regulatory agency is negatively affected
when the regulator is financed by any other form than through its own
operations. i.e. through licences and levies.
It is particularly problematic if the regulator is financed by the
government as it can impose conditions for the allocation of sufficient
budget. If the regulator does not have enough funds to sustain its
operations it can neither be effective nor independent, as it will be
driven by the need to ensure its financial viability. International
donors make use of this fact if it finances the regulator fully or
partially.  External financing by donors is also considered bad for the
independence of regulatory agencies, for instance funding obtained
from international funding institutions like the IMF or the World Bank.
Although these organisations have always advocated for the
independence of regulators, they often meddle in the affairs of the
funded regulators. Thus it is not surprising that experts consider the
independence of regulators to be negatively affected by such financing.
The reasons could be the funding organisations may be imposing
conditions along with the funding that could be harmful to the
regulator. It is common for these donor agencies to impose conditions
which are ill-suited to local situations in each country. It is on the
basis of the above that funding source is therefore selected as a core
indicator of regulator independence or otherwise in this study.
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3.7.1.5 Decision-making process
Consistent meddling into the affairs of the regulatory agency by the
government is a clear indicator of lack of independence to effectively
carry out regulatory activities. The possibility of aggrieved parties
appealing to the President or minister in the decision-making process
of the regulatory agency may diminish their independence as the
regulatory authority. This situation may have a negative effect on the
activities of the agency and that the regulatory body has a low level of
independence.
3.7.1.6 Content and provision of legislation
Expert opinion of the content and provision of the legislation
establishing the regulator, creating independence and guiding
operations will provide a good source of understanding of the legal
ramifications of the activities of the regulator. This is an important
indicator of regulator independence or otherwise.
3.7.1.7 Performance of the Regulatory Agency
The performance of the regulatory agency in executing its functions of
operator licensing, spectrum allocation and numbering are important
measures of regulator independence. Furthermore, the regulatory
agency’s performance in ensuring smooth interconnectivity between
operator services, universal services access, low budget pricing,
competition and quality of service are significant indicators of regulator
independence.
3.7.1.8 Regulatory staff expertise
Reputation and knowledge of industry on the part of regulatory staff
creates credibility and legitimacy for decision-taking. The technical
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ability of regulatory staff clearly indicates capacity to handle
complexities of industry regulation.
3.7.2 Telecommunications Sector Development Indicators
The following are indicators that were selected to provide an insight
into the extent of the telecommunications industry growth and
development.
3.7.2.1 Access and usage of services
The ability for operators to interconnect and use the services of the
incumbent operator is one of the key indicators of sector performance.
The regulator needs to ensure quality interconnection among operator.
The regulator also needs to ensure reasonable rates for
interconnection, Unbundling of interconnection, interconnection offered
without delay, sharing of incoming and outgoing IDD revenue,
payment for cost of interconnection links and switch interface and
payment for cost of technical disruption of interconnection. These are
important determinants of industry efficiency and effectiveness in
service delivery.
3.7.2.2 Number of operators
These are companies operating in the industry who come in different
sizes from the big service providers to small re-charge card sellers.
These operators expect impartiality on the part of the regulator
especially in terms of regulating competition and protection of their
investments. In turn operators are expected to provide excellent
services to the consumer at affordable rates without unnecessary
delays. The number of operators in the Nigeria telecoms industry will
provide an indication of the industry’s level of development and growth
within a stipulated time frame.
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3.7.2.3 Performance of operators
The performance of operators in terms of infrastructural development
by geographical spread, quality of service, interconnectivity fluidity,
user friendly service, pricing and efficient customer service are
considered very significant in the determination of industry
development.
3.7.2.4 Number of secondary service providers
An examination of the number of secondary service providers including
Value Added Network (VAN) indicates the extent of expansion in the
industry as well as the level of growth and development.
3.7.2.5 Employment generation
Telecoms operators also contribute to the Nigerian economy by directly
and indirectly creating jobs to provide and distribute their services.
There are several groups of jobs, which can be divided into two
subgroups that gravitate around telecoms services in Nigeria. The top
category of indirect employment encompasses equipment sales,
infrastructure deployment, advertising, marketing and public relations
as well as security — workers involved in the protection of base
stations. There are also mobile service resellers, recharge card
distributors, retailers, phone booth operators as well as street vendors.
The so-called mini call centres consist of simply one or a few mobile
phones and airtime bought in bulk from the operator.
Call centre operators allow other people to use the phone for a fee and
quite often will take a message, also for a fee. The number of such
jobs created within a stipulated period provides a good measure of
industry growth and development.
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3.7.2.6 New entrants into the industry
Licence conditions, exclusivity issues as well as all other conditions
necessary for obtaining licences to gain entry into the market should
be made known in clear terns to intending operators. The ease of entry
and exit in the market is a good indicator of industry development and
is given by the progressive increase in number of new entrants over
time.
The selection of these variables is in line with previous research
conducted by Samarajiva, et al (2007), Gual and Trillas (2006), Wu
(2004) Bandaranayake (2005), Gilardi (2003), and Gual (2003) where
similar variables were employed and evaluated using TRE and other
techniques. The justification for selecting these variables is located in
the nature of the telecoms industry in Nigeria and the circumstances
surrounding the independence of the regular in the country.
The selected variables are measurable and placed at the centre of the
core issue of regulatory independence and industry performance.
However, as explained by Genoud (2003a, p.44) it may be difficult to
precisely determine the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance despite volumes of empirical study done in this area. But
over the years several studies have shown that there are numerous
advantages accruing to industries whose regulators are adjudged
independence on the basis of some of the selected parameters
employed in this study.
3.8 RESEARCH POPULATION
The research population is the Nigeria telecommunications industry.
Specifically, interviews were conducted (using pre-determined
questions) to the followings groups.
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3.8.1 The regulator – The Nigeria Communication Commission
(NCC)
The regulator is the Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC): An
examination of the activities of the regulator was conducted to
ascertain its degree of independence and how that independence has
impacted on industry development. Top management staff and board
members were selected and interviewed and the resulting information
derived from this activity was presented and analysed in this study.
85
3.8.2. Industry operators
Industry operators consist of primary, secondary and tertiary players
engaged in the provision of telecoms services in Nigeria. A
representative sample was drawn using a stratified random sampling
technique. This is where the operators will be categorised by type of
operations and size.
3.8.3. Government policy makers – The Federal Ministry of
Information and Communications (FMIC)
The government is interested in ensuring that laws are created and
implemented for the general good of the citizens. The government is
responsible for the creating the enabling environment necessary for
the development of the country.
For the purpose of this study, key staff members of the Federal
Ministry of Information and Communications in Nigeria were
interviewed.
3.8.4 Academic institutions (University of Abuja) and
telecommunication journalist
Erudite academic experts in telecommunications as well as seasoned
telecoms industry journalists provide a good source of knowledge of
activities in the industry for comparison with information obtained from
other sources. Interviews were held with journalists and academics
which provided a rich base of materials for analysis.
3.8.5 Customers
The telecommunications products and services presently available to
consumers in Nigeria are varied and their tastes, needs and
expectations are equally wide-ranging. Consumers total over 85
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million as at October 2010 according to figures obtained from NCC
(2010). These consumers/customers are distributed across the vast
geographical area of the country, and have increasingly become more
aware of the usefulness and potentials of ICT products and services.
Conceptually, the consumer includes holders of high political office, the
shakers and movers of the country, youths, artisans, entrepreneurs,
businessmen and women, the rank and file of the military, fishermen
in the Niger-Delta as well as other parts of the country, the Fulani
herdsmen/cattlemen across the northern part of the country, and the
rural women who sell crayfish at local markets and so on. A purposive
sampling was used to select consumers who participated in the study.
3.9 DATA GATHERING, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
TECHNIQUE
Data gathering from the primary source was done using structured
interviews. Respondents for this research were key stakeholders that
are relevant to the communication industry in Nigeria including heads
of regulation of the Nigeria Communications Commission, MTN,
Globacom Plc, NITEL, Zain, Starcomms, Reltel, Etisalat, Visafon and
Linkserve as well as experts from the university community. The
interviews were geared towards finding out whether respondents feel
that the Nigeria Communication Commission is actually exercising its
mandate independently and whether the perceived NCC’s
independence or otherwise has an effect on the growth and
development of the telecoms industry in Nigeria.
Further issues to be explored include the kind of effect the
independence of NCC or otherwise may have in the industry. The
selection of the survey sample among the various stakeholders in the
Nigerian telecoms industry was done using the stratified purposive
sampling technique in order to give all elements of the population an
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equal chance of selection whilst making sure that samples from critical
stakeholders like the NCC were not omitted in the selection. This
follows and is in line with Creswell (2003, p.185) and Flyvbjerg (2006,
p.222) findings that “purposefully selected sites or individuals” would
be able to best help the researcher understand the research problem
and research question. For this reason, the sample interviewed is
considered representative of the entire research population. The
selected sample from the population was purposely targeted as the
sample elements are best able to contribute to understanding the
research question.
Information derived from interviews were recorded, classified,
analysed and compared against secondary data on sector
performance. Respondents’ majority views on questions raised formed
the basis for drawing conclusions and generating findings. The
findings obtained from this data source were then compared with
information obtained from secondary sources. The secondary source
yielded information with respect to growth and development of the
industry as well as independence of the regulator. Data were obtained
to cover a 10-year period from 2001 to 2010. The analysis was on the
basis of assigned weights of 0 – 1 to identified proxies representing the
key indicators selected for this study.
Subsequently an aggregation was made to determine the degree of
independence of the regulator, the extent of industry growth and
development and the influence of the regulator independence on this
growth.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ON THE DEGREE OF TELECOM REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE AND INDUSTRY GROWTH IN
NIGERIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with presentation of result and findings from the
interviews conducted with respondents representing the research
population. The research population is categorised into two broad
groups. The first group includes policy makers, senior staff of NCC and
Federal Ministry of Information and Communications. This group
represent stakeholders that are directly responsible for carrying out
regulatory activities. The second broad group is comprised of
operators, customers and experts in academia, media practitioners,
civil society and politicians. This second group represent stakeholders
that are directly affected by regulatory activities (operators, suppliers,
customers, associations, investors) and those who observe the
industry for other objectives (equity firms, media, academics, civil
society)
A total of 100 persons were interviewed for the study. The 100 persons
were selected as the sample representing the various stakeholders that
made up the research population. The interview was organised around
a cluster of questions that elicited responses on the three major
themes of the study as follows;
 The degree of telecom regulator independence
 The level of telecom industry growth and development
 The influence of the degree of regulator independence on the
level of industry growth and development
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The responses were generated through a combination of open and
closed ended questions. The close ended questions elicited responses
through a series of choice options which have allocated weights of
between 0 to 1, the options with 0 weights represent an extreme
negative situation while options with 1 weights represent an extreme
positive situation. The weights ranging between 0 to 1 represents
movement from a negative to a positive situation.
4.2 DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF NIGERIA
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S (NCC)
INDEPENDENCE
This section covers respondents from the first broad category of
respondents comprising the staff of the regulator (NCC) and staff of
the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications. Various
questions were put forward to 30 respondents in this category based
on some identified parameters and indicators. Responses were
collated, classified and weights duly allocated and cumulated to arrive
at an average majority view point.
The criteria for allocation of weights were derived from a combination
of sources including the works of Samarajiva (2008), Gual and Trillas
(2006), Bandaranayake (2005), Gilardi (2003), Gual (2003) and
Baudrier (2001). The responses received in this section were on the
basis of questions designed around the following key parameters and
indicators;
Stability indicator - Regulator (NCC) leadership/management and
commissioners/board members: Respondents were asked questions
with respect to the above mentioned critical NCC personnel in terms of
the following parameters;
 Regulator leadership/managements terms of office
 Appointment of regulators leadership: Who appoints the
regulator’s head?
90
 Dismissal of regulator’s leadership: Who can dismiss of the
regulator’s head?
 Second jobs for regulator’s leadership: This is to establish
conflict of interest or otherwise.
 Tenure of office of the regulator’s leadership
 Regulator (NCC) board members/commissioners terms of office
 Appointment of regulator’s board members/commissioners: Who
appoints the regulator’s board members/commissioners?
 Removal of regulator’s board members/commissioners: Who can
remove the regulator’s board members/commissioners?
 Second jobs for regulator’s board members/commissioners: This
is to establish conflict of interest or otherwise
 Tenure of office of the regulator’s board
members/commissioners
Regulator (NCC) relationships with government indicator:
This indicator is made up of responses regarding the relationship
between the regulator with executive, legislative and judiciary arms of
government. Respondents were asked questions with a view to
determining the following;
 Whether the regulator’s independence formally stated in the
enabling laws establishing the regulator?
 Formal obligations of the regulator to the government
 Formal obligations of the regulator to the legislature
 Who other than the court of law can overturn the decision of the
regulator where it has exclusive competency?
Control indicator: Respondents were asked questions regarding the
regulator’s (NCC) fiscal and organisational autonomy. The objective is
to generate sufficient information with respect to the following;
 Regulator funding – Who controls the regulator’s budget?
 Regulator funding – What is the source of the regulator’s
budget?
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 Internal organisation – Who decides on the regulator’s internal
organisation?
 Internal organisation – Who is responsible for the regulator’s
personnel policy?
 Organisation autonomy – Who is responsible for specific
regulatory functions?
 Organisation autonomy – Competencies of the regulator
Authority indicator: This indicator is designed around questions
regarding the regulator’s (NCC) authority to regulate. Responses
received centred on the following areas;
 Regulator’s power to regulate on prices and quality of service
 Regulator has power to grant new licences to operators
 Regulator has power to assign spectrum to operators
 Regulator’s power to regulate on anti competitive behaviour
 Adequacy of legal powers to ensure compliance and punitive
action
Outcome: The table below indicate the result of all data collected on
the basis of above indicators and parameters.
Table 4.2: The Degree of NCC‘s Independence
Indicators Max.
Weight
No. of
Respond
ents
Allocated
Weight of
Responses
Remark
Stability 1.0 30 0.6 Fairly stable
Relationships
with
government
1.0 30 0.5 Fairly independent
Fiscal and
organisational
autonomy
1.0 30 0.6 Fairly Independent
Regulatory
control
1.0 30 0.7 In control of
operations.
Authority to
regulate
1.0 30 0.8 High authority to
regulate
Outcome 3.2/5 =
0.64
Fairly Independent
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Source: Interview Extract (2010/2011) Note: A weight of 0.00 signifies
total regulator dependence and 1.00 indicates complete regulator
independence. Values between extremes indicate the degree of
regulator independence.
Overall regulator independence: The table above shows that NCC’s
degree of independence is weighted as 0.64, being an average score
generated from collated responses of majority of the respondent. This
qualifies NCC to be described as fairly independent.
4.3 DETERMINATION OF TELECOMS INDUSTRY GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
This section will consider responses from the second broad category of
respondents comprising operators, customers and experts in
academia, media practitioners, civil society and politicians. Various
questions were put to 70 respondents based on identified parameters
and indicators. Responses were collated, classified and weights duly
allocated and cumulated to arrive at an average majority view point.
The criteria for allocation of weight were derived from a combination of
sources including the works of Samarajiva (2008), Gual and Trillas
(2006), Bandaranayake (2005), Gilardi (2003), Gual (2003) and
Baudrier (2001). The responses received in this section were on the
basis of questions designed around the following key parameters and
indicators;
Ease of market entry indicator: Respondents were asked questions
with a view to determining the following;
 How easy is the market entry?
 Number of firms able to enter the market
 New investments into the industry
 Perception of transparency in industry regulation
 Perception of effectiveness of industry regulation
Service quality, pricing, access and usage indicator: Responses
were elicited from the survey respondents in order to determine the
following;
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 Effectiveness of tariff regulation
 Tariff trend for the past ten years
 Improvement in quality of service offered by operators and the
regulatory agency for the past 10 years
 Availability and access to scarce spectrum and numbers
 Enforcement of anti-competitive regulation
 Progress towards universal service access
 Availability and tele-density of telephones in rural communities
 Increased telephone access in under-served areas
Number of operators, secondary service providers and
employment generation indicator: Questions around this indicator
centred on the following areas of interest;
 The growth of number of operators or otherwise
 The growth of secondary service providers or otherwise
 The growth in employment generation or otherwise
Interconnectivity, service delivery, infrastructural
development, geographical spread and customer satisfaction
indicator: Questions in this area centred on the following;
 The quality of interconnection among operators
 Improvement in the quality of service supplied to consumers
including higher number of call completions and reduction in call
drop-outs
 Improvement in the quality of service supplied to consumers
including reduction in waiting lists, accuracy of consumer service
information, reduction in fault handling times, and customer
complaints
 The reliability of systems and components through compliance
with minimum availability criteria set by the NCC commission
 The difference in actual performance of Nigerian operators when
benchmarked against other countries, with regard to technical
and operational standards
 Steady reduction in the number of rural communities without
access to telephone
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 The availability and access to telephone services in all local
government areas throughout Nigeria
Outcome: The table below indicate the result of data all collected on
the basis of above indicators and parameters.
Table 4.3: Telecoms Industry Growth and Development in
Nigeria
Indicators Maximum
Weight
Number of
Respondents
Allocated
Weight of
Responses
Remark
Ease of market entry 1.0 70 0.5 Medium
difficulty
Service quality,
pricing, access and
usage
1.0 70 0.6 Improving
Number of operators,
secondary service
providers and
employment
generation
1.0 70
0.9
Growing
Interconnectivity,
service delivery,
infrastructural
development,
geographical spread
and customer
satisfaction
1.0 70 0.6 Improving
Outcome 2.6/4 =
0.65
Steady
growth
Source: Interview Extract (2010/2011) Note: A weight of 0.00 signifies
industry stagnation and 1.00 indicates a large industry growth. Values
between extremes indicate the degree of industry growth and
development
Result: The table above indicate that the telecoms industry growth
and development in Nigeria is adjudged by the majority of respondents
to be experiencing a steady rise with huge of opportunity for
improvement. The weight of 0.65 was arrived at after collating and
averaging all the responses. This weight indicate an above average
industry growth and development.
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4.4 THE EFFECT OF REGULATOR INDEPENDENCE ON
TELECOMS INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA
This section cover responses from all stakeholders in all identified
respondents categories for interview in this study including the NCC,
FMIC, operators, media, civil society and academia among others.
Various questions were put to 100 respondents based on identified
parameters and indicators.  Responses were collated, classified and
weights duly allocated and cumulated to arrive at an average majority
view point.
The criteria for allocation of weight were derived from a combination of
sources including the works of Samarajiva (2008), Gual and Trillas
(2006), Bandaranayake (2005), Gilardi (2003), Gual (2003) and
Baudrier (2001). The responses received in this section were on the
basis of questions designed around the key parameters and indicators
that will show the effect of regulator independence and industry
performance. The following questions were put forward to the
respondents in order to elicit their response that will clearly indicate
their perceptions on key issues surrounding the influence of the degree
of regulator independence on the telecom industry growth and
development/performance in Nigeria. The questions are as follows;
 Do you consider the regulator NCC independent?
 Has the independence of the regulator (NCC) affected the
development and performance of the telecommunications
industry in Nigeria?
 What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to access to telecoms services?
 What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to increased telecoms service usage?
 What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to pricing?
 What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to quality of service?
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 What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to competition?
Outcome: The table below indicate the result of data collected on the
basis of above the questions seeking to determine the influence of the
degree of regulator independence on industry performance.
Table 4.4: The Effect of Regulator Independence on Telecoms
Industry Performance in Nigeria
Indicators Maximu
m
Weight
Number of
Respondents
Allocated
Weight of
Responses
Remark
Degree of
regulator
independence
1.0 100 0.86 Significant
degree of
independence
Effect of regulator
independence on
industry growth
1.0 100 0.86 Significant
Regulator
independence and
telephony service
access
1.0 100 0.80 Significant
Regulator
independence and
telephony service
usage
1.0 100 0.80 Significant
Regulator
independence and
telephony service
pricing
1.0 100 0.60 Fairly significant
Regulator
independence and
telephony service
quality
1.0 100 0.70 Significant
Regulator
independence and
telephony service
competition
1.0 100 0.85 Highly significant
Outcome 5.47/7 =
0.78
Regulator
reasonably
independent
/significant effect
of independence
on industry
growth and
development
Source: Interview Extract (2010/2011) Note: A weight of 0.00 signifies no
impact on growth and 1.00 indicates a large impact on growth. Values
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between extremes indicate the degree of impact on industry growth
and development.
Result: The table above shows that majority of respondents perceive
the effect of regulator independence on telecoms industry growth as
significant and sees the regulator (NCC) as reasonably independent.
4.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This section will provide a summary of the various parts to produce an
overall result. The table below presents the summary of results
obtained from previous sections of this chapter.
Table 4.5: Summary of results
Indicators Maximum
Weight
Number of
Respondents
Allocated
Weight of
Responses
Remark
Degree of
regulator
independence
1.0 30 0.64 Fairly
Independent
Telecoms
industry growth
and development
1.0 70 0.65 Growing
Effect of
regulator
independence on
industry growth
and development
1.0 100 0.78 Significant
Outcome
Source: Interview extract (2010/2011) Note: A weight of 0.00 signifies no
impact on growth and 1.00 indicates a large impact on growth. Values
between extremes indicate the degree of impact on industry growth
and development.
The criterion for allocation of weight is based on the criteria adopted in
allocating weight to responses received in previous sections of this
chapter.
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This part is generally concerned with reporting the result obtained from
sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 all in line with previous research by
Bandaranayake (2005), Gual and Trillas (2006), Gual (2003).
Final outcome: The outcome of various responses received from the
100 respondents interviewed for this study is as follows:
1. Degree of regulator (NCC) independence – Fairly/reasonably
independent
2. Telecoms industry growth and development - Growing
3. Effect of regulator independence on industry growth and
development – Significant
The evidence therefore indicates that a regulator which scores above
average degree of independence is also perceived to be above average
with regards to enhancing sector performance and industry growth.
The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of the results.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH
FINDINGS ON TELECOM REGULATOR
INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an analysis of the results/findings presented in
the previous chapter. The findings of this study will be used to answer
the research questions put forward whilst specifically attaining the
research objectives of the study.
The Nigerian telecommunication sector has undergone a wave of
market liberalisation since the year 2000, resulting in the numerous
attempts to sell and privatise the Nigerian national carrier (NITEL); the
emergence of a second national operator (GLOBACOM); the issuance
of licences to new operators in the GSM space, as well as other sundry
incumbent telecommunications operators. Penetration and growth
have been reasonable in terms of increased subscriber base, increased
investments in both human and physical capital, employment
generation and sound contribution to the domestic economy.
Competition in the industry has been intense among both major and
smaller operators who are focusing on defending their market position,
lowering their cost, growing their subscriber base as well as
maximising revenues. These competing operators predominantly adopt
price competition and service differentiation as their strategies to
attract a larger market share.
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The Nigerian telecoms industry is presently dominated by mobile
telephone service operators whose major source of market share is
through the provision of prepaid service.
The Nigerian telecoms consumer is known to be highly price sensitive,
hence the strong drive for operators to compete on pricing. However,
once price is exhausted as a competitive tool, operators increasingly
turn to services and promotions as a major approach for
differentiation. This is already beginning to happen given the array of
technology based products being introduced into the telecoms market
in Nigeria.
To ensure that this trend is sustained, it is imperative that a clearly
designed policy must be adopted. This will further strengthen the
gains already made and enhance the growth and development of the
industry. One of the ways of identifying areas for improvement and
measures to be adopted to ensure further industry growth and
development is through the increasing independence of NCC in
regulating the industry (Baez and Kechiche, 2010).
However, evidence from this study shows that although NCC scores
above the average, more still needs to be done to improve its
independence and legitimacy to improve sector performance.
5.2 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FROM DATA OBTAINED
FROM PRIMARY SOURCES
A total of 100 respondents were interviewed and their distribution is as
follow:
Table 5.2: Distribution of Respondents
Indicators Number of
Respondents
Degree of regulator independence 30
Telecoms industry growth and development 70
Effect of regulator independence on industry
growth and development
100
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Total 100
In examining the issue of degree of regulator independence 30
respondents from NCC and Federal Ministry of Information and
Communication were interviewed in the following key independence
indicators:
1. Stability of tenure: The result indicates that NCC is considered
fairly stable with respect to appointment, tenure and dismissal
of executive management and commissioners/board members.
This stability makes it possible to describe the organisation as
reasonably independent, despite the fact that
commissioners/board members as well as executive
management are appointed by the executive arm of government
with approval of the legislature. All other appointments and
dismissals are internally handled and controlled by the
regulator. Basically, the stability of leadership is a good
measure of a regulator’s degree of independence and protection
from political influences in carrying out the organisations
responsibilities.
2. Regulator relationship with government and the national
assembly: NCC is also adjudged as fairly independent on the
basis of its relationship with the executive and legislative arm of
government. This is because the regulator’s budget is normally
submitted to the legislature for approval. Supervisory
responsibility is vested with the Federal Ministry of Information
and Communication in Nigeria.
3. Regulator fiscal and organisational autonomy: NCC was found to
be fairly independent but still rely on the government for
funding of its operations. Although the organisation raises funds
from licences and other sources, these are not sufficient to
prevent NCC from accepting government funding. However,
NCC is fully in control of its organisational operations, including
personnel, licensing and all other functional activities.
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4. NCC’s regulatory control: The respondents agree that NCC has
considerable control over its activities and operations. This is a
good indicator of the degree of independence.
5. NCC’s authority to regulate: The NCC is believed to have a high
degree of authority to regulate the telecoms industry in Nigeria.
Finding: NCC’s degree of independence is weighted as 0.64, being an
average generated from collated responses of majority of the
respondents. This qualifies NCC to be described as fairly/reasonably
independent. In examining issues relating to telecoms industry growth
and development in Nigeria, various questions were put forward to 70
respondents and the following outcome emerged:
1. Ease of market entry: Entry into the Nigeria telecoms market is
considered to have a medium level difficulty. This difficulty is
categorised as medium level because the majority of the
respondents agree that there is growth in the number of
industry operators and investments into the industry. However,
they all concur that market entry is fairly difficult while industry
regulation is largely seen as reactive and often ineffective.
Additionally, industry regulation is also not considered
transparent by many respondents.
In contrast a recent survey conducted by the NCC on
transparency and regulatory effectiveness of NCC reveals that
about a third (33.7%, 35.6% and 39.0%) of respondents who
are made up of the individual telecoms service consumers,
corporate telecoms service consumers and service agents
respectively interviewed adjudged NCC as being fair in enforcing
high quality service by service providers, as well as access to
market entry and exit.
The overall picture obtained from the outcome of the survey is
that the NCC is seen to be transparent by a slight majority of
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consumers surveyed. This is given that 58.7% of individual
consumers, 62.6% of corporate consumers and 60.1% of
service agents consider the NCC transparent in its activities as
regards quality control and ease of market entry activities.
2. Service quality, pricing, access and usage: Improving service
quality, pricing, access and usage. The majority of respondents
agree that while there has been improvement in all the listed
parameters, although there is room for further improvements in
line with international service offerings.
The effectiveness of NCC in quality control is shown to be
improving over the years especially on enforcement of
regulation that facilitates the delivery of high quality service.
This is consistent with the findings of the NCC survey which
suggests that the various stakeholders are only fairly satisfied
with the performance of NCC. Just a slight majority, (53.7%,
53.4% and 50.8%) of the three categories of respondents
(individual consumers, corporate consumers and service agents)
respectively were of the opinion that NCC was effective in
enforcing high quality service by service providers.
The findings of the NCC survey also indicate that the NCC
performed fairly well as regards ensuring service availability.
About a third of the respondents (37.6%, 38.9% and 35.2%)
made up of individual consumers, corporate consumers and
service agents respectively, were of the opinion that the NCC
performed fairly well in ensuring service availability. The low
proportion signifies the importance of further work to done by
NCC to aid the efforts of operators in penetrating the telecoms
market especially in the rural areas of Nigeria.
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3. Number of operators, secondary service providers and
employment generation indicator: There is an increasing number
of operators, secondary service providers and employment.
Respondents unanimously agree that there is growth in the
listed parameters with more space for further growth.
4. Interconnectivity, service delivery, infrastructural development,
geographical spread and customer satisfaction indicator: The
outcome as per this indicator is varied. Many respondents agree
that geographical spread of telecoms services is increasing and
interconnectivity is also improving. With regards to service
delivery and customer satisfaction, most respondents perceive
service delivery as poor, customer satisfaction also poor, and
infrastructural development as slow.
Meanwhile, in response to the question on interconnection, the
NCC survey findings suggest that the respondents are relatively
satisfied with the performance of the NCC. About a third (37.8
%) of the individual consumers, 39.5% of corporate consumers
and 38.4% of service agents were of the opinion that the NCC
performed fairly well as regards ensuring interconnectivity.
In addition, another third (38.5%, 42.4% and 35.6%) of the
individual consumers, corporate consumers and service agents
were of the opinion that the NCC was good in regulating the
quality of recharge cards. The NCC survey also asked if the
respondents were aware of the NCC’s consumer affairs bureau
and whether they have lodged complaints. A good number
(72.0%, 57.4% and 69.1%) of individual consumers, corporate
consumers and service agents respectively, indicated that they
were not aware of NCC’s Consumer Affairs Bureau, while 74.6%,
64.8% and 76.1% of the individual consumers, corporate
consumers and service agents respectively, do not have the
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knowledge of the functions of NCC’s consumer affairs bureau.
Moreover, a considerable number (90.4%, 88.0% and 93.7%) of
individual consumers, corporate consumers and service agents
respectively, have never lodged complaint with NCC consumer
affairs bureau.
On the result of the response rate of NCC’s consumer affairs
bureau, 34.1%, 40.0%, and 50.0% of the individual consumers
and corporate consumers and service agents, who have ever
lodged complaint, were of the opinion that the response rate
was good. On accessibility of the consumer affairs bureau, the
result shows that a considerable number (66.2%, 67.9%, and
75.5%) of individual consumers, corporate consumers and
service agents respectively, were of the opinion that the
consumer affairs bureau is not accessible.
Among those who have lodged a complaint with the bureau,
59.2% of individual consumers, 80.6% of corporate consumers
and 69.2% of service agents were of the opinion that the bureau
was not effective. As regards the customer forum (people’s
parliament), the majority (67.0%) of the corporate consumers
and over half (50.2%) of the service agents were aware of the
customer forum. On the other hand, over half (54.5%) of the
individual consumers were not aware of the customer forum.
On the effectiveness of the forum, the result shows that among
those who were aware of the NCC’s customer forum, about a
third (31.8% and 37.4%) of the individual and corporate
consumers were of the opinion that the NCC customer forum
was fairly effective, while about two-fifths This is closer to a
third (28.6%) of the service agents were of the opinion that the
NCC’s customer forum was effective.
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Most importantly, the result shows that the majority of the
individual consumers (85.5%), corporate consumers (83.3%)
and service agents (86.8%) indicated that they do not get
adequate information from the NCC.
5. Consumer protection: Many respondents agree that the NCC has
facilitated its treatment of consumers. The regulator has
established channels through which grievances could can routed
and resolved.
This is consistent with the views of telecoms customers and
operators obtained by NCC in their 2010 survey. The result of
the NCC survey on the protection of consumer interests,
suggests that the individual and corporate consumers and
service agents were fairly satisfied with the performance of NCC.
About a third (31.3% and 29.3%) of corporate consumers and
service agents respectively were of the opinion that NCC was
effective in protecting consumer interests while about the same
proportion (29.0%) of individual consumers were of the view
that NCC was fairly effective in consumer interests’ protection.
As regards resolving customer complaints, the result suggests
that the NCC has not satisfied telecommunications stakeholders.
A third of the individual consumers, and service agents (34.9%,
and 34.7%) were of the opinion that the NCC performed poorly
in resolving customer complaints. Although a third of the
corporate consumers (32.9%) adjudged the NCC as being fair in
their performance in resolving customer complaints, another
third (32.5%) adjudged them to be poor.
Furthermore, the result shows that sizeable proportions (39.5%,
42.8% and 40.8%) of the individual consumers, corporate
consumers and service agents respectively, were of the opinion
107
that the NCC performed poorly as regards sanctioning of
defaulting service providers. Some of the reasons for their
response include that the NCC has never, to their knowledge
sanctioned any service provider and that it allows the service
providers to behave like ultimate monopolies.
6. Competition: As regards industry competitive practices, the
result shows that two-fifths (39.0%) of the service providers
considered NCC effective in ensuring healthy competition among
industry operators. In addition, a third (30.5%) of the providers
were of the view that NCC’s rules for fair pricing were adequate.
As regards the NCC’s effectiveness in enforcing compliance with
the pricing rules, a third (30.5%) were of the opinion that NCC
was effective while 28.8% of the providers were of the view that
the NCC was ineffective in enforcing compliance with pricing
rules.
Furthermore, 36.8% of the providers were of the opinion that
NCC was ineffective in enforcing compliance with quality service
in telecommunications industry. The effectiveness of the NCC as
an independent regulator and its effectiveness in combating
abuse of market power was also examined by the survey.
In the section of the survey that seeks to examine the NCC’s
effectiveness in combating abuse of market power by service
providers, a third (29.8%, 29.5%, and 30.7%) of the
respondents, for individual consumers, corporate consumers and
service agents respectively were of the opinion that NCC was
ineffective in combating abuse of market power. High tariffs,
poor interconnectivity and low response to complaints were the
main reasons given by the respondents for their opinions.
Although they had similar views, the size of their percentage
responses varied across stakeholders.
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7. Rating in concrete areas of quality control: On their opinion in
concrete areas, the result shows that 34.9%, 42.1%, and 42.3%
of the respondents, for individual consumers, corporate
consumers and service agents respectively, were of the opinion
that the NCC was fair in regulating charges. The second largest
group were those that considered it ineffective in this area. This
constitutes 33.1%, 34.9% and 30.2% of individual consumers,
corporate consumers and service agents respectively.
8. Dispute Resolution: The result shows that about two-thirds
(66.0% and 62.1%) of the individual consumers and service
agents respectively were not aware of measures by the NCC to
resolve disputes between service providers and consumers. On
the other hand, over half (51.5%) of the corporate consumers
indicated that they were aware of the measures. Among those
who indicated that they were aware of these measures, about a
third (33.8%, 36.4 and 35.7%) of individual consumers,
corporate consumers and service agents were of the opinion
that the measures used by the NCC were fairly effective. In
addition, another third (30.8%, 31.5%, and 29.0%) of individual
consumers, corporate consumers and service agents
respectively were of the opinion that NCC was effective in
promoting competition among service providers.
Findings 1: Telecoms industry growth and development in Nigeria is
deemed by the majority of respondents to be experiencing a steady
growth, with plenty of opportunity for improvement. The weight
arrived at through collating and averaging the responses is at 0.65
indicating a fairly reasonable growth above 50% and moving closer to
full attainment.
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A total of one hundred (100) respondents making up all the
respondents selected for this study were interviewed regarding their
perceptions on the degree of the NCC’s independence as well as the
effect of such independence or otherwise on telecoms industry growth
and development in Nigeria. The responses yielded the following
results:
Degree of regulator independence: Significant
Effect of regulator independence on industry growth: Significant
Regulator independence and telephony service access: Significant
Regulator independence and telephony service usage: Significant
Regulator independence and telephony service pricing: Fairly
significant
Regulator independence and telephony service quality: Significant
Regulator independence and telephony service competition: Highly
significant
Findings 2: The effect of regulator independence on telecoms industry
growth and development is considered by the majority of the
respondents in this study as significant and the regulator (NCC) is seen
as reasonably independent.
Overall findings: The final outcome being that firstly, the degree of
regulator (NCC) independence is found to be fairly/reasonably
independent. The Nigeria telecoms industry is found to be steadily
growing thus showing a positive growth and development. Finally, the
effect of regulator independence on industry growth and development
is established as significant.
This result is also consistent with the finding obtained by an NCC
survey of telecoms service operators in 2010. The finding of this
survey which sought the opinion of telecoms service providers is as
follows:
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Opinion on licensing: Virtually all the service providers (92.4%) were
aware of the licensing requirements of the Nigerian Communications
Commission. Over half of them (54.8%) as against 45.2% indicated
that the requirements, especially the accompanying documents are not
too stringent. In addition, the majority (65.2%) as against (25.8%) of
were of the opinion that the procedure for evaluating licence
applications was transparent. On rating of the procedure, 83.7%
indicated that the procedure was commendable.
Furthermore, about a third (30.0%) of the service providers were of
the opinion that the cost was neither fair nor reasonable. Those who
said that the cost was not fair were of the opinion that the charge
should be reviewed downwards and made affordable because the
majority of the population is not happy with the current situation.
Regulatory Effectiveness: The result shows that about a third (32.8%)
of the service providers were of the view that the NCC was effective as
a regulator. On some specific issues, same proportion (30.2%, 44.4%
and 38.7%) of the service providers were of the opinion that the NCC
was ineffective in approval of equipment used by operators, overseeing
the quality of service provided by operators and in setting terms for
interconnection of different networks respectively.
Monitoring: About a third of respondents (30.3%) indicated that NCC
never visited to monitor them.
Quality Control: A third (37.3%) of the service providers indicated that
the NCC’s rules for ensuring quality control by service providers were
fair. A third (31.7% and 35.0%) of the service providers also rated
their resource capacity as being fair and good respectively to
effectively monitor and ensure good quality services.
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In addition, (32.2%) adjudged their personnel capacity as being good
and fair respectively.
Feedback and Communication: The result shows that the majority
(65.6%) of the providers were of the opinion that licensing
requirements were well communicated to industry operators.
On overall rating of channels of communication, 39.0% and 33.9% of
the service providers rated the channels of communication between
communications industry operators and the NCC as being effective and
fairly effective respectively.
Industry Competitive Practices: The result shows that about a third
(39.0%) of the service providers considered the NCC effective in
ensuring healthy competition among industry operators. Also, the
result indicates that another third (30.5%) of the providers were of the
view that the NCC’s rules for fair pricing were adequate.
On the opinion of the providers on NCC effectiveness in enforcing
compliance with the pricing rules, about a third (30.5%) were of the
opinion that the regulator was effective, while 28.8% considered it
ineffective. Furthermore, 36.8% of the providers were of the opinion
that the NCC was ineffective in enforcing compliance with quality
service in telecommunications industry.
On what can be done to improve performance, the service providers
suggested that the NCC should allow new competitors into the market,
continue in policies and efforts, employ people to enable them to reach
out, improve equipment and physical inspection, improve on services
given to consumers, ensure compliance with rules, ensure that there is
improvement in interconnectivity, assist more in curbing of illegal
operators.
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They also suggested that the NCC should double its efforts, grant more
licences, put in more effort into ensuring cheaper services, overhaul
their administrative and technical set-up, and retrain personnel.
Interpretation of findings and answers to research questions:
Analysis of the findings provides the following answers to the research
questions research sub questions outlined in chapter 1 above.
1. Regulator independence is shown to have positively affected
the growth of telephony services, thereby increasing service
access to a larger population in Nigeria. This tends to confirm
the information derived from secondary data showing an
increasing growth in the subscriber base of mobile phone
service operators.
2. Regulator independence is also shown to have had a positive
effect on telecoms service usage in Nigeria. Majority of the
respondents in this study perceive the regulator as acting
independently as a result of its power to regulate on issues
concerning network expansion and service quality.
3. Regulator independence is also perceived as positively
influencing telecoms services pricing in Nigeria, although,
many respondents strongly uphold the view that service
tariffs are high and have not been reducing at the expected
rate and speed. Therefore, the respondents insist that more
control needs to be put in place to monitor price activity in
the industry. However, they agree that regulator
independence has a major effect on the performance of
industry operators with respect to pricing among other
things.
4. Regulator independence was also found to have a highly
significant effect on industry competition. This is because the
regulator is perceived to be adequately empowered to issue
licences to new operators and ensure fairness in dealing with
all operators. The perception of fair arbitration by the
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regulator has increased the level confidence on the part of
investors in the industry given the number of new operators
being consistently introduced into the industry and the rapid
expansion of telecom infrastructure across the country.
5. Regulator independence was also found to have significant
effect on quality of service and customer satisfaction. The
respondents perceive the regulator as fair in ensuring that
customer are treated well by the operators and that service
quality is consistently improved. This is all as a result of the
degree of the regulators independence through it power to
regulate industry activities.
The responses to the sub questions enabled the researcher to present
the following answer to the main research question:
What is the extent of regulator independence in the Nigeria telecoms
industry and how has this affected the growth and development of the
industry?
The regulator (NCC) is found to be reasonably/fairly independent
because of the stability of tenure of its management staff and
commissioners, the nature of its relationship with the government, its
level of fiscal and organisational autonomy, the extent of its regulatory
control as well as the extent of its authority to regulate industry
activities. The effect of the regulator’s degree of independence on
industry performance, growth and development has been found to be
significant and have positively affected the industry in the area of ease
of market entry by new operators, industry competition, quality of
service, pricing, access and usage of services, interconnectivity and
infrastructure deployment, secondary service providers and
employment generation as well as consumer protection.
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5.3 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS FROM DATA OBTAINED
FROM SECONDARY SOURCES
The secondary sources of data yielded some evidence to corroborate
the findings derived from data obtained from primary sources.
Conversely, it is a widely held view that the Nigerian
telecommunication industry has great potential for growth given the
population of the country running at above 146 million people and the
number of people connected on any of the available telecoms
networks. Presently, according to the Nigeria Communication
Commission (NCC, 2010a) the number of SIM cards sold and fixed
network subscribers in Nigeria is 85 million as at October 2010. The
actual users of communications service could be lower than that but
the progress is remarkable as compared to the teledensity of less than
1% in 2001. However, it is also a clear indication of the industry
growth potential.
Additionally, further statistics show that the growth of GSM networks
reached 77 million active SIM card lines, with this segment of the
industry recording a market share of 91.1 percent. The total connected
lines in the telecoms market also peaked at 104,915,200 by October
2010 with mobile GSM networks accounting for 90,124,301; mobile
CDMA networks having 12,045,580 and fixed/wireless networks,
2,745,319. This position is graphically presented below.
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This shows that the GSM has a huge impact on the development and
growth of the telecommunications industry. As at 2001 when GSM
was introduced in Nigeria the subscriber base was a mere 266,461 as
against the latest figure of 90,124,301 according to the Nigeria
communications commission (NCC, 2010a).
Furthermore, during the same period to October 2010 the Nigerian
telecoms market had a recorded total installed capacity of
157,357,716 subscriber lines spread across the diverse technology
platforms in the telecoms market. From this figure, mobile GSM
networks have installed 130,875,419 lines; mobile CDMA networks
have 17,146,554 while fixed/wireless networks have 9,335,743. This
notable installed capacity could only be possible because of the volume
of private investments flowing into the industry.
The volume of investment must have facilitated the deployment of this
installed capacity. The figure below shows the volume of private
investments into the industry from 2001 to March 2010.
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The figure above displays the volume of private investments into the
telecommunications industry in Nigeria from 2001 to March 2010. The
flow of investment into the industry is broken down as indicated in the
table below.
Table 5.3a: Private investment flow into the telecoms sector in
Nigeria from 2001 to March 2010
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 March
2010
US$
milli
on
1,200 2,100 4,000 6,080 7,500 8,500 11,500 12,500 14,500 18,000
Source: NCC (2010a)
The table above shows a healthy growth in private investment into the
industry from US$1.2bn in 2001 to a respectable US$18bn by March
2010. This investment expanded operator activity and resulted in the
deployment of infrastructure to improve quality of service, increase
geographical spread and grow service access to rural area.
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The figure below is a graphical representation of the spread of
infrastructure and operational base stations in Nigeria.
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The deployment of infrastructure as clearly indicated by the figure
above shows a significant coverage of 103,632 km of microwave radio.
This attests to the increasing spread of infrastructure to achieve the
universal access target of both NCC and the operators. Over US $15
billion has been invested by telecommunication operators in the
provision of infrastructure and human capital development in Nigeria
over the last nine years according to the Association of Licensed
Telecoms Operators of Nigeria (ALTON, 2010).
The association opined that increase in competition and high demand
for better quality of service by customers has led to the reduction in
the number of unconnected people, even as the association insists that
the population of citizens in need of telephone lines was declining,
leading to the dwindling of the average revenue per subscriber. They
further attributed the success of the telecommunications industry in
Nigeria to the efforts and investments made by the network operators
and service providers of all different sectors within and outside the
telecoms industry.
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This is in addition to the supervisory role effectively handled by the
NCC due to its operational independence from the government, unlike
the period before the establishment of the NCC when the government
had total and direct control over industry/operator activities through
the Federal Ministry of Information and Communication.
Furthermore, the association concluded that the increase in investment
and deployment of infrastructure has had a positive effect on the
subscriber base of service users given the general growth of
subscribers in Nigeria. The table below corroborate this situation
through showing the user penetration rate from 2001 to 2009.
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Table 5.3b: Telecoms market indicators 2001 – 2009
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Subscription
penetration
of
population
0.3% 1.2% 2.4% 7.2% 13.8% 20.9% 28.2% 43.1% 48.7%
User
penetration
of
population
0.3% 1.1% 2.2% 6.5% 12.0% 17.4% 23.3% 34.5% 37.8%
Source: Baez and Kechiche, (2010)
The user penetration of telecoms services according to Baez and
Kechiche (2010) grew from a mere 0.3% in 2001 to a respectable
37.8% in 2009. This steady growth is reputedly as a result of
competition among service operator umpired by the NCC which created
the needed environment for competition to thrive. The NCC was able
to do this due to its degree of independence from government control.
This independence gave the NCC the freedom to create intense
competition among service providers through facilitating the
proliferation of prepaid plans, low-cost handsets and the rapid
expansion of mobile networks to different parts of the country (Baez
and Kechiche, 2010). From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
telecoms industry in Nigeria experienced modest but notable growth
and development from 2001 to 2010.
This could be strongly attributed to the degree of regulator
independence as evidenced by responses received in interviews
conducted during the course of this study. The level of industry growth
is deeper than what it was before the creation of the NCC. The various
statistics presented above corroborate the findings generated from the
data obtained from primary source through interviews of different
industry stakeholders.
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This is also in line with the findings of various studies on regulator
independence and telecoms industry growth and development. Some
such studies include Samarajiva (2008), Gual and Trillas (2006),
Bandaranayake (2005), Gilardi (2003), Gual (2003), and Baudrier
(2001).
In considering the degree of regulator independence different views
have been advanced by various authors. However, there seems to be
a broad consensus on what constitutes regulator independence. At the
centre of this is the authority of the regulator to take decisions without
undue interventions from the government or influences from the other
industry stakeholders, such as, for instance, decisions with respect to
setting up guidelines on industry tariffs, determination and
implementation by operators without seeking approval from the
government. Additionally no agency or entity other than the court of
law has the authority to overturn the regulator’s decisions. Moreover,
this regulator’s freedom to take decisions is divided into three
dimensions.
 The first relates to the legal dimension where the regulator’s
executive management and board members/commissioners are
appointed and dismissed in accordance to clearly stipulated legal
provisions. In addition to this the regulator should be placed
outside the ministry and must be free to appoint and dismiss its
regular staff and should be in full control of its human resource
management. This is often referred to as an arms length
relationship with political authorities.
 The second freedom of the regulator that indicates its degree of
independence is its ability to keep an arm’s length relationship
with regulated operators, private investors, citizens, consumers
and all other stakeholders who could significantly influence the
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regulator’s ability to provide fair and just regulatory supervision
in the industry.
 The third freedom is the ability of the regulator to be financially
independent through securing additional sources of funding
outside government funds. This financial freedom will ensure
that the regulator fulfils it functions effectively. This
organisational autonomy includes such things as secured
funding sources, but also includes an exemption from restrictive
civil service salary rules. These attributes are considered
necessary to foster the requisite expertise and to underpin those
arm’s-length relationships required to guarantee the regulator’s
independence (Eberhard, 2007; Smith, 1997).
Conversely, going by the findings of this study as evidenced by the
recorded interview responses generated from the primary source of
data, the degree of regulator (NCC) independence in the Nigeria
telecoms industry is seen to be at fairly above average levels. The NCC
is fully responsible for decisions of all their operations except in the
area of funding. The government is responsible for partially funding the
NCC with approval from the legislative arm of government.
Another area of control by the government is in the appointment of
executive management and commissioners/board members of the
NCC. This control is fully enshrined within the enabling law
establishing the regulator. This independence is believed to have
basically released the regulator to focus on regulatory activities,
facilitating competition among operators, licensing more operators and
setting up the ground rules for playing in the telecoms market in
Nigeria. Therefore, the telecoms industry growth and development in
Nigeria could be indirectly attributed to the independence of the
regulator.
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The NCC decided to open up the Nigerian telecoms market to
operators both local and international in competition with the
government-funded main fixed line operator (NITEL). This effort and
subsequent efforts by the regulator have enhanced access to telecoms
service by a large sector of the population. At the moment, Nigeria has
overtaken South Africa to become the continent’s largest mobile
telecoms market with now over 77 million mobile SIM card holders
alone.
Astonishingly, market penetration still stands at only around 50% (in
early 2010), indicating a huge potential for further growth. However,
as reported by the respondents interviewed, usage has recovered and
more lines are being taken up and more mobile connections are being
made daily. In terms of geographical spread of telecoms services in
Nigeria, many respondents agree that more areas have been
penetrated, regardless of the fact that many of the service operators’
customers are located in urban areas rather than rural areas.
Therefore, this makes much of the remaining addressable market in
the country to be mostly located in the rural areas.
As reported by the Association of Licensed Telecoms Operators of
Nigeria (ALTON, 2010) network rollouts and operations are expensive
and make it difficult to cover the rural areas faster as fast as was
envisaged. Although a good measure of infrastructure deployment
being maintained.
Another area of interest indicating the growth and development of the
telecoms industry in Nigeria is pricing and tariff for telecoms services,
especially mobile telecoms services. Over the years from 2001 to date
there has been a marked decline in prices and tariffs. This may have
been as a result of intense competition among service providers as
well as the declining cost of purchasing mobile handsets and other
accessories. However, the majority of respondents interviewed for this
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study expressed concerns over the pricing of telecoms services. They
insist that prices and tariffs have not reduced at the rate people
expected, thus effectively making mobile telecoms services
unaffordable to the poorer people especially those in the rural areas.
Another area of concern as expressed by the respondents is the quality
of telecoms service which according to them has been improving but
has not yet reached a satisfactory level. The majority of these
respondents want the regulator to come up with more guidelines that
will further ensure reasonable prices are charged by the operators and
improved quality of service for an enhanced customer satisfaction.
The respondents concur that the NCC has been able to create
competition in the telecoms which facilitated the release of massive
investment into the industry. This makes the telecoms industry in
Nigeria a goldmine in terms of profitability thus generating industry
development very rapidly.
Finally, in terms of employment creation as a measure of industry
growth and development, the telecoms industry has been prominent
from 2001 to 2010. This is as a result of the introduction of
competition into the industry within this period. For instance, the
mobile telecoms segment of the industry has created over three million
jobs according to Baez and Kechiche (2010) during this period, in both
direct and indirect employment. The direct jobs include employment at
the regulatory agency as well as operators’ personnel.
Indirect jobs are sub-divided into two groups, the first being jobs or
companies providing sales and marketing functions, public relations
and advertising firms, equipment/infrastructure deployment firms,
security and logistics firms. The second sub-division is related to jobs
like recharge card sellers, recharge card distributors, call centre
operators, mini call centre operators, and street vendors. Furthermore,
the growth that has been recorded in the industry has also led to
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employment of significant numbers of Nigerians from abroad. These
are professionals, who have acquired useful international experience
and knowledge, and have been attracted back home.
The findings obtained from analysing primary source data and the
corroborative statistics as well as other authoritative views
demonstrate that the effect of regulator independence on telecoms
industry growth and development is significant in Nigeria. This is also
consistent with findings of previous research conducted on the
significance of regulator independence on telecoms industry growth
and development. Moreover, the majority of experts in the literature
go along with this position, for instance Melody (1997), (Ndukwe,
2006) and Cukierman, et al (1992).
5.4 FURTHER EVIDENCE: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS OF
NCC 2010 SURVEY ON REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY
AND EFFECTIVENESS IN NIGERIA
The NCC 2010 survey on regulatory transparency and effectiveness of
the NCC had respondents drawn from three groups namely; individual
customers, corporate customers and service agents or operators.
According to the survey report NCC (2010b), the respondents of the
survey revealed a number of facts as follows;
 The survey shows that the Global System for Mobile (GSM)
communications is the most widely used medium of
communication in Nigeria. Up to 96% of the individual
consumers and 80% of the corporate consumers interviewed
in the survey made use of GSM services. This implies that
many Nigerians view the NCC’s function as primarily linked to
the provision of GSM services.
 The survey shows NCC’s ratings as noticeably lower in the
south and south-eastern geopolitical zones than in the other
zones in almost all the categories of respondents. The NCC
125
would have to examine the resources it has available in these
areas to move towards enhancing the delivery of quality
service.
 As regards its effectiveness as a regulator, consumers were
fairly satisfied with NCC’s performance in protecting
consumer interests. However, as regards their effectiveness
in combating abuse of market power by service providers,
about a third (29.8%, 29.5% and 30.7%) of individual
consumers, corporate consumers and service agents
considered it ineffective.
 The NCC is seen to be transparent in enforcing high quality
services by 58.7% of the individual consumers, 62.6% of the
corporate consumers and 60.1% of the service agents.
 As a promoter of competition amongst service providers, the
survey shows that the NCC is perceived to be doing a good
job. A total of 64.6% of individual consumers, 67.2% of
corporate consumers and 61.7% of service agents rated the
NCC as highly effective, fairly effective or effective in this
function. A large percentage of consumers listed the
licensing of many service agents as the key determinant of
their views.
 In the area of effectiveness in enforcing high quality services,
a slight majority (53.7%, 53.4 and 50.8%) of individual
consumers, corporate consumers and service agents
respectively, considered the NCC effective in these activities.
 The service providers showed considerable approval of the
NCC’s regulatory activities and its transparency in general.
More than half of them (54.8%) felt that the requirements
were not too stringent. A majority (65.2%) also thought the
procedure for evaluating licences was transparent. However,
only 30% of them thought that the cost of licences was fair.
 The NCC was also viewed as effective in its regulatory
functions by majority of the service providers. They consider
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the NCCs capacity to fulfil its regulatory functions to be well
above average in the areas of resources, personnel, technical
competence and organisational competence. The areas that
were thought to require improvement are the regulation of
charges, enforcing sanctions on service providers and the
resolving of customer complaints. The NCC was considered
better in regulating the quality of recharge cards and in
ensuring interconnectivity between networks and ensuring
service availability.
 Many consumers interviewed in the NCC survey are of the
opinion that call charges, tariffs or costs associated with the
GSM mobile phone are excessive. This is irrespective of the
oversight responsibilities of the NCC in this regard, thereby
questioning NCC’s effectiveness in regulating prices.
 On communication and feedback with consumers. Many
respondents of the NCC survey admit not being aware of the
NCC’s Consumer Affairs Bureau, a centre designed to provide
customer service to all telecom service customers. About
72% of individuals, 57% of corporate bodies and 69% of
service agents were unaware of its existence. The majority of
those that were conscious of its presence considered it
inaccessible. However, the People’s Parliament (another NCC
customer interaction medium) by comparison, is much better
known and more highly rated. In addition, as indicated by
the NCC survey report NCC (2010b) the People’s Parliament
proved to be a determining factor in the assessment of the
NCC’s transparency.
 Many respondents listed the interactive, public or
broadcasted forums as evident signs of the NCC’s
transparency. Most importantly in this area, an
overwhelming majority of respondents, (85.5% of individual
consumers, 83.3% of corporate consumers and 86.8% of
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service agents) indicated that they do not get adequate
information from the NCC.
The result of the NCC survey highlights areas in which the NCC can
improve its performance towards achieving its regulatory objectives.
This could include the institutionalisation of customer survey by NCC.
This is because surveys provide ample ground for self-evaluation, and
should be conducted at least every two years. An alternative is to
disaggregate the instrument, identify and single out certain critical
areas, and conduct selective surveys in these areas periodically.
Moreover, to facilitate the use of surveys as an effective means of
improving NCC’s performance in the telecommunications sector, the
surveys should be reviewed every two years by independent
consultants.
The NCC survey reveals that most of the respondents were of the
opinion that NCC was poor in communication and resolving customer
complaints and sanctioning of defaulting service providers. Most of the
respondents explain that they are not aware of NCC’s Consumer Affairs
Bureau and their functions or measures for resolving customer
complaints. Those who know of the existence of the Customer Affairs
bureau consider it inaccessible and therefore are of the view that they
do not get enough information from NCC. Those who have lodged
complaints with the bureau indicated that it was ineffective in handling
them.
In order for NCC to improve interactions with its customers, the
activities of the Consumer Affairs Bureau need to be re-evaluated and
improved. Since it is principally aimed at consumers, the generalised
ignorance of its existence shows that it needs to channel its energies,
not merely towards sending out information, but towards ensuring that
it reaches all the consumers in an amenable form, and that feedback is
properly gathered and processed.  The key point to note is that if the
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consumer is well informed, he/she will be well placed to provide
feedback that will be of use to the NCC in its regulatory functions.
Additionally, since NCC’s People’s parliament has proven very popular
amongst consumer’s it should be used as a means for communicating
industry news and even promoting the plans of NCC. With regards to
transparency, the licensing of operators which was viewed so
favourably should also be publicised, so that consumers know
whenever new licences are issued. The sanctioning of service
providers who default on regulations should be made public as this is a
clear sign of transparency.
Service quality was a complaint made by some respondents and who
insist service quality is a major determinant of their perception of the
NCCs effectiveness. However, in the opinion of the respondents, the
NCC has generally performed well in some areas. Specifically,
individual consumers, corporate consumers and service agents were of
the opinion that NCC has been fairly effective in protecting consumer
interests, transparent and effective in enforcing high quality service by
service providers, fair in regulating charges, ensuring interconnectivity
and ensuring service availability and good in ensuring quality of
recharge cards, and effective in promoting competition among service
providers.
For NCC to move towards greater improvement in achieving its
regulatory objectives there is also the need for creation of NCC offices
in all the states of Nigeria to facilitate monitoring, follow-up and
resolving of consumer’s complaints as well as reduction in licence fees
and training and retraining of staff, especially technical staff
responsible for supervision and monitoring of providers. In addition,
improvement in protection of consumer interests especially through
facilitation of reduced charges and improved interconnectivity,
monitoring to ensure that only licensed providers operate, enforcement
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of compliance with rules and improved information dissemination
should be emphasised by the NCC.
The findings of the NCC survey clearly support the findings of our
study derived from the analysis of data generated from both primary
and secondary sources.
5.5 CONCLUSION
The chapter analyses findings generated from both primary and
secondary sources and the outcome indicates that NCC is
fairly/reasonably independent and this has enhanced its capacity to
influence growth and development in the Nigeria telecoms sector from
2001 to 2010. A modest growth has been recorded for the industry
over the years and the creation of NCC, and its degree of
independence had played a prominent role in the recorded industry
growth.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 SUMMARY
The study examined the significance of regulator independence
towards the growth and development of the telecoms industry in
Nigeria. The central question therefore that the study addressed is the
determination of whether the establishment of the Nigeria
Communication Commission (NCC) as the sole telecoms industry
regulator in Nigeria has created the required regulatory environment
free from undue influence from government and political interests that
will galvanise growth and development in the industry. The study also
focused on addressing the issue of whether the NCC is sufficiently
independent and whether this independence or otherwise has
facilitated the growth and development of the industry.
Chapter one of this study explored background information and
provided an introduction to the telecommunications industry in Nigeria.
The chapter contained the problem statement, purpose statement,
research objectives, research question, scope and limitations of the
study as well as chapter scheme.
Chapter two surveyed and actively engaged existing literature on the
significance of regulator independence in the telecommunications
industry. The contributions made by various experts, authors, and
other stakeholders in the telecommunications industry were reviewed,
presented and discussed. The theoretical framework of the study was
then formulated and established.
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The chapter contained discussions on regulation, regulator
Independence, the structure and governance for regulator
independence, measuring regulator independence, independence and
accountability of the regulator, sustaining independence of the
regulator, challenges of the lack of regulator independence, constraints
of achieving independence, regulatory function and regulator
independence, customer-driven regulation and regulator independence
and provided a conclusion.
The third chapter dealt with the research methodology covering an
introduction, perspectives on measuring effectiveness of regulator
independence, as well as methods of gathering primary and secondary
data, including discussion of a qualitative analysis approach based on
the TRE survey technique and structured interviews. The chapter
further discussed a number of descriptive indicators for data gathering
and analysis, as well as the data analysis technique.
Chapter four presented the findings of the research while chapter five
dealt with the evaluation of the findings, analysis and interpretation of
data derived from primary and secondary sources. This chapter deals
with a summary, conclusion and recommendations.
6.2 CONCLUSION
The inability of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) to
meet the telecommunications needs of the Nigerian citizens had
prompted the deregulation of the telecommunications sector in Nigeria.
This deregulation led to the establishment of the Nigerian
Communications Commission (NCC) by government decree No. 75 of
1992 to regulate the telecommunications industry, ensure the
provision of adequate, effective and efficient telecommunications
services nationwide at an affordable price, and to provide local and
international communications service.
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The enabling decree provided for the independence of the NCC to
regulate without undue political interference. However, it must be
noted that regulator independence is a means to an end and not an
end in itself. Telecommunication customers in Nigeria just like
customers in other parts of the world expect to receive quality service
at competitive rates. Regulators are generally charged with the
responsibility of ensuring efficient service delivery at reduced cost and
making certain that service delivery standards are fully maintained. At
the same time the regulator is required to ensure that service
providers remain financially solvent in order to attract the desired level
of investment necessary for the growth and development of the
industry. Effective regulator independence could facilitate the
achievement of these objectives while any meddling on the part of the
government could undermine efforts geared towards the achievement
of the stated objectives of the regulator.
However, in some circumstances the safeguards established to ensure
regulator independence may be compromised through inadequate
commitment on the part of the regulator or the government.
Compromise could also come in the form of political grandstanding and
sometimes lack of institutional capacity or as a result of human
resource deficiencies. This may culminate in poor and inconsistent
regulator decisions. Hence, a regulator without a reasonable degree of
independence may end up taking sensitive decisions wrongly. In
addition to this, undue political interference could also turn a regulator
into an institution that lacks the resources and capacity to make
quality, predictable, justifiable, robust, transparent and credible
decisions to the detriment of the growth and the development of the
industry.
133
Over the years covered by this study (2001 to 2010), the Nigerian
telecommunications industry has experienced significant but modest
growth and development following the introduction of the Global
System for Mobile Communications services (GSM) in 2001, as a result
of the creation of an independent regulator the NCC (NCC, 2010a).
Nigeria, previously regarded as one of Africa’s under-served countries
in telecoms services has risen through the ranks to attain the enviable
position of Africa’s largest telecommunications market with cumulative
revenue of $12 billion as at December 2009 as reported by the NCC
(NCC, 2010a). Investment flow into the industry, especially in the
mobile telecoms segment, has seen massive growth. The mobile
telecoms segment is reportedly having a positive impact in the
telecoms industry in general as well as the national economy at large.
The impact is recorded by generating substantial investment in
infrastructure. According to the NCC, during the past decade
approximately $16 billion has been invested in projects related to
mobile telecoms services in Nigeria. Therefore, the nation has thus
been effectively integrated into the global telecoms environment (NCC,
2010a).
Again, according to the NCC, prior to full liberalisation of the sector,
the number of telephone lines in the country was less than 500 000.
Nine years after liberalisation, there are more telephone subscribers,
running into millions phone lines. Accordingly, experts generally concur
that the liberalisation of a country’s telecommunication industry is
often associated with increasing economic growth across various
sectors.
However, these experts contend that the success of this liberalisation
depends on regulatory policies that are conducive to the development
of competition. Basically, the implementation of these necessary
regulatory policies will have to be supervised by an independent
regulator.
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The independence of a regulator is expected to provide the enabling
capacity to foster competition among operators thereby optimising
investments into the industry.
In Nigeria upon the creation of NCC and during the initial stages of
liberalisation, the competition in the industry improved from the
previous situation of zero competition. This is as a result of the arrival
of mobile telecoms operators into the market and the subsequent
expansion of their coverage in response to the demands of changing
technology. Subsequently, competition became stiff, necessitating the
need for effective operator management, reduced pricing regimes,
improved quality of service, increased service access, enhanced
service usage, improvement in geographical spread among other
important benefits of competition.
Before the introduction of GSM in 2001, the structure of the NCC had
been largely designed around how to licence operators and bring
services to the consumers. However, the focus of the regulator is now
changing into how to manage competition between operators in a
market providing different services. Effectively managing competition
and ensuring delivery of quality services to consumers has consistently
become the key factor that underscores NCC’s regulatory dispensation.
This may be as a result of their increasing degree of independence
from undue political influence and is indeed a demonstration of NCC’s
growing independence and capacity to take decision for the growth and
development of the telecoms industry in Nigeria.
However, as this study has shown, the significance of regulator
independence in the telecoms industry’s growth and development is
massive.  The NCC scores just above the average with regard to its
independence, and so must actively strive to become a more
independent regulator able to generate all its funds from sources
outside government funding and effectively deliver on its mandate.
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this study show that the Nigeria telecoms industry has
experienced a modest growth and the NCC is found to be
fairly/reasonably independent. The recognition of this degree of
independence is derived from the observation of the prevailing level of
stability in the structure and management of the regulator, its power
to independently earn its financial resources from sources outside
government funding as well as its unimpeded authority to regulate the
industry. However, the regulator is not fully financially independent
because substantial portion of its funding comes from the government.
The study further identified a significant influence of the regulator’s
degree of independence on industry growth and development in the
form of increased access and usage of telephone services by the
citizens, increased competition in the industry, improved quality of
service and pricing. Although the issues of appropriate pricing for
mobile phone services, complete coverage of the Nigerian population
as well as service quality are not fully sorted. Therefore, in order for
the NCC to achieve the regulatory objectives of the telecoms industry
in Nigeria more work has to be done. It is in this vein that the
following recommendations are made.
1. The NCC should use better ways to communicate their activities
in order to enlighten the public and create more transparency in
its operations. Most respondent interviewed for this study agree
that majority of the public do not know or understand the
functions of the NCC and its role in the industry. This shows that
the NCC is largely unknown by many citizens of Nigeria,
therefore better media coverage by means of advertising,
mainly on the radio which has a much wider coverage, is
essential for the regulator to establish its presence.
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Consumers have to be well-informed on the rights they have to
good services and accurate billing and the channels available to
them.
2. The licensing of any new service provider should be prominently
featured in the print media, as this is a clear manifestation of
the NCC’s interest in promoting competition amongst service
providers and in combating any abuse of market power. This is
undoubtedly good press for the NCC.
3. Releasing the regulator (NCC) from excessive control by the
ministry. This seeks to take away the excessive political
interference often associated with government full control of the
regulator.
4. Establishing and following professional criteria for appointment
of all NCC personnel. This presupposes the existence of clear
appointment guidelines and job expectations during the course
of recruitment of NCC personnel and executive management
personnel.
5. The appointment of NCC management staff and commissioners
should involve both the executive and the legislative branches of
the government in the appointment process.
6. Adequate salaries and other remunerations should be paid to
NCC personnel, which would also help to reduce concerns about
corruption.
7. The NCC should also strive to attain full financial independence
through generating more funds from other sources outside
government subventions. This full financial independence may
have a good effect on the activities of the NCC. Having a
reliable source of funding, usually earmarked levies on regulated
firms or consumers will considerably reduce the influence of the
government on the activities of the regulator
8. Emphasis on professionalism, specialisation, commitment and
expertise in the NCC.
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9. The NCC has to focus on such areas of concern as the issue of
frequency or spectrum allocation and SIM registration as well as
the number portability. Other areas needing NCC attention
include pricing/tariffs and quality of service
10.The NCC must address the issues of capacity constraint and
infrastructure deployment, large market and high demand,
frequency allocation problems, connectivity issues and quality of
service, and inadequate base stations.
11.The telecoms service providers should also continue to expand
their coverage beyond urban areas unto rural areas as most
rural areas of the country are still without telecommunications
network coverage. Rapid roll-out of network resources such as
base stations and switches should result in improved quality of
service by improving on their transmission infrastructure across
the country. Moreover, fiber optic and microwave transmission
lines should be constructed to achieve further efficiency in
network transmissions.
12.Further liberalisation of the sector is encouraged. This will
facilitate the entrance of more providers, healthy competition
and the rendering of quality service.
13.The NCC Consumer Affairs Bureau has to be put within the reach
of telecommunications services users. Regional offices have
proven to be insufficient. The Commission would do better by
having offices in all the states of Nigeria.
14.In relation to service providers, forums specific to certain types
of service providers should be organised by geopolitical zones
and after sufficient publicity. They will help to improve the
communication process between them and the Commission and
identify their problems more concretely.
15.The NCC should improve on the protection of consumer’s
interests. This can be achieved by compelling the providers to
standardise and reduce charges, improve on interconnectivity,
quality of service and service provision.
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16.The NCC should also improve on monitoring and enforcing
compliance with rules by providers, especially ISPs, to ensure
that they give quality service to their customers. They should
equally review the licence charges. This will help reduce the
tariff charge to telecommunications consumers.
17.The regulator should ensure that those who did not obtain a
licence or permit do not operate. This will help guarantee the
quality of service provided as the licensed providers would
always work within the dictates of the NCC in order to avert
licence revocation.
18.To facilitate the provision of quality service by providers, the
NCC should ensure that technical officers that supervise the
facilities used by the providers are well trained and retrained to
be abreast of recent developments in the industry. It should also
be more firm with the providers that default in any of the
aspects of service provision as this will serve as a check and
thus help guarantee quality service delivery.
19.The federal government of Nigeria should redouble its efforts to
solve the massive problem of the provision of social
infrastructure such as electricity. The prevalence of erratic
power supply in Nigeria is famously known to increase capital
costs and operating costs of the telecoms operators in Nigeria.
Addressing the issues outlined above will impact positive on the growth
and development of the telecom industry in Nigeria.
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ANNEXURES
Annexure I: Interview Schedule
Introduction
My name is Abbas Fufore of the University of Witwatersrand South
Africa. I am a post graduate student of Management ICT – PR
conducting a research on the significance of regulator independence in
the development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria.
This interview is designed to elicit responses from various respondents
connected with the above topic. The responses to be obtained will be
used for research purposes and confidentiality is guaranteed. No
names are required.
The purpose of the research is to determine the degree of
independence of the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) (the
regulator) and the impact of such independence on the growth and
development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. The
findings of this research will be beneficial in refocusing attention of all
stakeholders in the industry toward a better and much improved
telecoms industry and advance knowledge in this realm.
The interview will take approximately 30 minutes and responses will be
manually recorded on paper only.
PART A:  DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF NCC INDEPENDENCE
This part covers respondents from NCC and Federal Ministry of
Information and Communications
Section 1: Stability of NCC’s management team and board
members
Q1: What is your designation?
Q2: How were you appointed?
Q3: What is your term of office?
150
Q4: What is your tenure of office?
Q5: How is dismissal done with respect to your office?
Q6: Do you have a second job?
Section 2: Relationship with government and the national
assembly
Q1: Do you think NCC’s independence is formally stated?
Q2: What are the formal obligations of NCC to the government?
Q3: What are the formal obligations of NCC to the national assembly?
Q4: Who other than the court of law can overturn the decision of the NCC
where it has exclusive competency?
Section 3: Fiscal and organisational autonomy
Q1: What are the sources of NCC’s budget and what is the composition?
Q2: How is NCC’s budget controlled?
Q3: Who decides on NCC’s internal organisation?
Q4: Who is in charge of NCC’s personnel policy?
Q5: Who is competent for NCC’s regulatory functions?
Q6: What are the core competencies of NCC?
Section 4: NCC’s regulatory legitimacy
Q1:  How many staff does NCC have?
Q2: What is the staff skill mix in terms of qualification and experience?
Q3: What tools does NCC use to communicate with operators?
Q4: What methods/tools does NCC use to reach out to the public?
Section 5: NCC’s authority to regulate
Q1: What is NCC’s power to regulate on prices and quality of service?
Q2: Does NCC have the exclusive power to grant new licences to
operators?
Q3: Does NCC have the exclusive power to assign spectrum to
operators?
Q4: Does NCC the exclusive power to regulate on anti competitive
behaviour?
Q5: Does NCC have adequate of legal powers to ensure compliance
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and punitive action?
PART B:  DETERMINATION OF INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
This part will consider responses from operators, customers and
experts in academia, media practitioners, civil society and politicians.
Section 1: – Ease of market entry
Q1: How easy is the market entry?
Q2: Do you think the number of firms able to enter the market
has increased over the years?
Q3: Do you think there has been increased investment into the
industry?
Q4: How do you perceive transparency in industry regulation?
Q5: How do you perceive effectiveness of industry regulation?
Section 2: Service quality, pricing, access and usage
Q1: How effectively have tariff been regulated?
Q2: What is the tariff trend for the past ten years?
Q3: Has there been any improvement in quality of service offered by
operators and the regulatory agency for the past 10 years?
Q4: Do you think access to scarce spectrum and numbers ensured?
Q5: How effectively has the anti-competitive regulation been
enforced?
Q6: What is the progress made towards universal access?
Q7: How available are telephones in rural communities?
Q8: Has there been increased telephone access in underserved
areas?
Section 3: Number of operators, secondary service providers
and employment generation.
Q1: Has the number of operators been increasing?
Q2: Has the number of secondary service providers been increasing?
Q3: Has the industry generated an increase in employment?
152
Section 4: Interconnectivity, service delivery, infrastructural
development, geographical spread and customer satisfaction
Q1: How effective is the interconnection regime?
Q2: Has there been improvement in the quality of service supplied to
consumers, including higher number of call completions and reduction
in call drop -outs?
Q3: Has there been improvement in the quality of service supplied to
consumers including reduction in waiting lists, accuracy of consumer
service information, reduction in fault handling times, and customer
complaints?
Q4: Has there been improvement in reliability of systems and
components through compliance with minimum availability criteria set
by the NCC?
Q5: Do you think there is an improvement in actual performance of
Nigerian operators when benchmarked against other countries with
regard to technical and operational standards?
Q6: Has there been a steady reduction in the number of rural
communities without access to telephone?
Q7: Had there been increased availability of telephone access to all
local government areas throughout Nigeria?
PART C: EFFECT OF REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE ON INDUSTRY
PERFORMANCE
This part will cover responses from all stakeholders identified for interview in
this study including NCC, FMIC, operators, media, civil society and academia
among others.
General Questions
Q1: Has the independence of the regulator affected the development
and performance of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria?
Q2: Do you consider the NCC independent?
Q3: How do you consider the effect of regulator independence on
industry performance with respect to increased telecoms service
usage?
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Q4: What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to quality of service?
Q5: What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to pricing?
Q6: What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to competition?
Q7: What is the effect of regulator independence on industry
performance with respect to access to telecoms services?
Closing
Thank you for taking part in this important research designed to
determine the impact of regulator independence on
telecommunications industry development in Nigeria. Your
contributions are highly appreciated and will assist strongly in reaching
a conclusion towards finding an answer to the research question for
this study.
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Annexure II: Regulatory Independence Survey Questionnaire
Introduction
My name is Abbas Fufore of the University of Witwatersrand South
Africa. I am a post graduate student of Management ICT – PR
conducting a research on the significance of regulator independence in
the development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria.
The questionnaire is designed to elicit responses from various
respondents connected the above topic. The responses to be obtained
will be used for research purposes and confidentiality is guaranteed.
No names are required.
The purpose of the research is to determine the degree of
independence of the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) (the
regulator) and the impact of such independence on the growth and
development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. The
findings of this research will be beneficial in refocusing attention of all
stakeholders in the industry toward a better and much improved
telecoms industry and advance knowledge in this realm.
The questionnaire will take approximately 5 minutes to complete and
responses will be manually recorded on paper only. The following
dimensions relating to NCC independence will be assessed:
Stability of NCC’s management team and board members
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
Relationship with government and the national assembly
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
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Fiscal and organisational autonomy
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
NCC’s regulatory legitimacy
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
NCC’s authority to regulate
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
Closing
Thank you for taking part in this important research designed to
determine the impact of regulator independence on
telecommunications industry development in Nigeria. Your
contributions are highly appreciated and will assist strongly in reaching
a conclusion towards finding an answer to the research question for
this study.
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Annexure III: Telecoms Regulatory Environment Survey
Questionnaire
Introduction
My name is Abbas Fufore of the University of Witwatersrand South
Africa. I am a post graduate student of Management ICT – PR
conducting a research on the significance of regulator independence in
the development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria.
This Questionnaire is designed to elicit responses from various
respondents connected the above topic. The responses to be obtained
will be used for research purposes and confidentiality is guaranteed.
No names are required.
The purpose of the research is to determine the degree of
independence of the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) (the
regulator) and the impact of such independence on the growth and
development of the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. The
findings of this research will be beneficial in refocusing attention of all
stakeholders in the industry toward a better and much improved
telecoms industry and advance knowledge in this realm.
The questionnaire will take approximately 5 minutes and responses will
be manually recorded on paper only. The following dimensions relating
to the growth and development of the telecoms industry in Nigeria will
be assessed. Kindly tick the appropriate box to select your answers.
Ease of market entry
Easy (  )
Indifferent (  )
Difficult (  )
Service quality, pricing, access and usage
Excellent ( )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
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Poor (  )
None (  )
Number of operators, secondary service providers and employment
generation
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
Interconnectivity, service delivery, infrastructural development,
geographical spread and customer satisfaction
Excellent (  )
Good (  )
Fair (  )
Poor (  )
None (  )
The effect of NCC independence on telecoms industry growth
and development
Very significant (  )
Significant (  )
Fairly reasonable (  )
Low significance (  )
Insignificant (  )
Closing
Thank you for taking part in this important research designed to
determine the impact of regulator independence on
telecommunications industry development in Nigeria. Your
contributions are highly appreciated and will assist strongly in reaching
a conclusion towards finding an answer to the research question for
this study.
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Annexure IV: Data recording and computation form
Indicators Maximum
Weight
Number of
Respondents
Allocated
Weight of
Responses
Remark
Degree of regulator
independence
 Stability of NCC
Management Team
and Board Members
 Relationship with
Government and the
National Assembly
 Fiscal and
Organisational
Autonomy
 NCC’s Regulatory
Legitimacy
 NCC’s Authority to
Regulate
Total
Telecoms industry growth
and development
 Ease of market entry
 Service quality,
pricing, access and
usage
 Number of operators,
secondary service
providers and
employment
generation
 Interconnectivity,
service delivery,
infrastructural
development,
geographical spread
and customer
satisfaction
Total
Effect of regulator
independence on industry
growth and development
Outcome
